Re: [PATCH] x86/traps: Rework #PF[Rsvd] bit handling

[Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>]

On 19.05.2020 16:29, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 19/05/2020 09:14, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 18.05.2020 17:38, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> The reserved_bit_page_fault() paths effectively turn reserved bit faults 
>>> into
>>> a warning, but in the light of L1TF, the real impact is far more serious.
>>>
>>> Xen does not have any reserved bits set in its pagetables, nor do we permit 
>>> PV
>>> guests to write any.  An HVM shadow guest may have reserved bits via the 
>>> MMIO
>>> fastpath, but those faults are handled in the VMExit #PF intercept, rather
>>> than Xen's #PF handler.
>>>
>>> There is no need to disable interrupts (in spurious_page_fault()) for
>>> __page_fault_type() to look at the rsvd bit, nor should extable fixup be
>>> tolerated.
>> I'm afraid I don't understand the connection of the first half of this
>> to the patch - you don't alter spurious_page_fault() in this regard (at
>> all, actually).
> 
> The disabling interrupts is in spurious_page_fault().  But the point is
> that there is no need to enter this logic at all for a reserved page fault.
> 
>>
>> As to extable fixup, I'm not sure: If a reserved bit ends up slipping
>> into the non-Xen parts of the page tables, and if guest accessors then
>> become able to trip a corresponding #PF, the bug will need an XSA with
>> the proposed change, while - afaict - it won't if the exception gets
>> recovered from. (There may then still be log spam issue, I admit.)
> 
> We need to issue an XSA anyway because such a construct would be an L1TF
> gadget.
> 
> What this change does is make it substantially more obvious, and turns
> an information leak into a DoS.

For L1TF-affected hardware. For unaffected hardware it turns a possible
(but not guaranteed) log spam DoS into a reliable crash.

>>> @@ -1439,6 +1418,18 @@ void do_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>>>      if ( unlikely(fixup_page_fault(addr, regs) != 0) )
>>>          return;
>>>  
>>> +    /*
>>> +     * Xen have reserved bits in its pagetables, nor do we permit PV 
>>> guests to
>>> +     * write any.  Such entries would be vulnerable to the L1TF 
>>> sidechannel.
>>> +     *
>>> +     * The only logic which intentionally sets reserved bits is the shadow
>>> +     * MMIO fastpath (SH_L1E_MMIO_*), which is careful not to be
>>> +     * L1TF-vulnerable, and handled via the VMExit #PF intercept path, 
>>> rather
>>> +     * than here.
>>> +     */
>>> +    if ( error_code & PFEC_reserved_bit )
>>> +        goto fatal;
>> Judging from the description, wouldn't this then better go even further
>> up, ahead of the fixup_page_fault() invocation? In fact the function
>> has two PFEC_reserved_bit checks to _avoid_ taking action, which look
>> like they could then be dropped.
> 
> Only for certain Xen-only fixup.  The path into paging_fault() is not
> guarded.

Hmm, yes indeed.

Jan