[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] x86/traps: Rework #PF[Rsvd] bit handling
On 18.05.2020 17:38, Andrew Cooper wrote: > The reserved_bit_page_fault() paths effectively turn reserved bit faults into > a warning, but in the light of L1TF, the real impact is far more serious. > > Xen does not have any reserved bits set in its pagetables, nor do we permit PV > guests to write any. An HVM shadow guest may have reserved bits via the MMIO > fastpath, but those faults are handled in the VMExit #PF intercept, rather > than Xen's #PF handler. > > There is no need to disable interrupts (in spurious_page_fault()) for > __page_fault_type() to look at the rsvd bit, nor should extable fixup be > tolerated. I'm afraid I don't understand the connection of the first half of this to the patch - you don't alter spurious_page_fault() in this regard (at all, actually). As to extable fixup, I'm not sure: If a reserved bit ends up slipping into the non-Xen parts of the page tables, and if guest accessors then become able to trip a corresponding #PF, the bug will need an XSA with the proposed change, while - afaict - it won't if the exception gets recovered from. (There may then still be log spam issue, I admit.) > @@ -1439,6 +1418,18 @@ void do_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) > if ( unlikely(fixup_page_fault(addr, regs) != 0) ) > return; > > + /* > + * Xen have reserved bits in its pagetables, nor do we permit PV guests > to > + * write any. Such entries would be vulnerable to the L1TF sidechannel. > + * > + * The only logic which intentionally sets reserved bits is the shadow > + * MMIO fastpath (SH_L1E_MMIO_*), which is careful not to be > + * L1TF-vulnerable, and handled via the VMExit #PF intercept path, rather > + * than here. > + */ > + if ( error_code & PFEC_reserved_bit ) > + goto fatal; Judging from the description, wouldn't this then better go even further up, ahead of the fixup_page_fault() invocation? In fact the function has two PFEC_reserved_bit checks to _avoid_ taking action, which look like they could then be dropped. Jan
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