Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/5] VT-d support for PV guests

[Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On 20/5/08 11:43, "Espen Skoglund" <espen.skoglund@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>> Is there a good reason to hide this behind a boot option?
> 
> The patchset does, as you guessed, enable isolation for PV guests with
> direct hardware access.  If you assign a PCI device to a guest you are
> guaranteed that the assigned device can't access the memory of other
> guests or Xen itself.  The patchseet allows the device to access all
> its own memory which it has write access to, and memory which is
> granted to it.
> 
> The only reason for making it a boot option was to allow for the old
> behaviour (i.e., complete access) to be the default behaviour until
> people get more confident with the patches.

Okay. Well it seems that there have been some comments to be dealt with in
another iteration of these patches. But apart from that I'm happy in
principle to apply these patches.

 -- Keir




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