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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/5] VT-d support for PV guests

To: Espen Skoglund <espen.skoglund@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/5] VT-d support for PV guests
From: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 20 May 2008 08:39:48 +0100
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On 19/5/08 21:27, "Espen Skoglund" <espen.skoglund@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> I've added some preliminary support for VT-d for paravirtualized
> guests.  This must be enabled using an 'iommu_pv' boot parameter
> (disabled by default).
> 
> I've added some python bindigs to allow xend to assign PCI devices to
> IOMMU for PV guests.  For HVM guests this is handled in ioemu.  Not
> sure if it makes sense to handle both cases in one place.
> 
> The changes currently hook into get_page_type() in xen/arch/x86/mm.c
> to map/unmap IOMMU pages when the page types change.  This might
> not be the apropriate place to hook these calls.

What functionality does this patchset enable, Espen? Is this a security
enhancement (isolation/containment) for PV guests with direct hardware
access? For example: can access all its own memory except that which has
pagetable/GDT type, and only foreign memory which is granted to it?

Is there a good reason to hide this behind a boot option?

 Thanks,
 Keir



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