[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [PATCH] tools/xenstored: Harden corrupt()
- To: Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>
- From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 15:10:55 +0200
- Arc-authentication-results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=suse.com; dmarc=pass action=none header.from=suse.com; dkim=pass header.d=suse.com; arc=none
- Arc-message-signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com; s=arcselector9901; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-ChunkCount:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-0:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-1; bh=Ciq/mpICNyOEXmFvjm4x0WcGyDt0FHAi/Cs6ANCUgNE=; b=MviDKhFSNMV44Eb4/8YlQLWbQ1KbSyRyUUROLdZYPNw1syChqc3hW16RNrBcnQ6sYy6phnUBtV02xIMFkyQZjpNwc6/qBvcaO8lfE/vWugScOUOMT6AImtxNhDEPvnVtpaN44Hg6kgYSFtmPEjmIy30zM1NXlGqJoUvxqichHIA/WuCx2B5Xxxyv4Bj7BAWjjiXqZwu8BdIFl9/CvCWjboOBVXLJr4r0TnmOj8CHhlGTaCWXEey+y95UaLkgR3tFoRJO65lL8oy2WfQwSgyX4l8ntwJSNLlj3in7TAXOsimlsFevQL8t/DbF9krM0D9b6qEkp/t3A/Q7KXl4wmD4vw==
- Arc-seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector9901; d=microsoft.com; cv=none; b=PuA5kfUUCXfyToYuDvGmsQXA0Y7sD2xsUoTPKvzyrND8PtYmfgzloy/RnZlgbkRHT8OPMflufX7uSkDpm8OfmKPDMYtQDROEevPZrJPz7t5XmoSOxUKS2H0vglKyvr1720AxhMn57ewlea5JrHYp6Tf1Hqw/sfignL8RgRhHCLF0nOZX2beSCjVJJvDe/jokXuNn6kKukoE7i6+96E4YcEE5+IXrOuCFbIzC2QYOL5HvlaiHXGTqRkA7kDBMHKh3MZOeRCJeNhrhqR6teEDBt8ZIl6wX6DD7JQQPrlOl2M0QKqTXXa7OHUMTH3FU/O9Xa3nr15atTi4gPdqcfMhyCA==
- Authentication-results: dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none;dmarc=none action=none header.from=suse.com;
- Cc: Julien Grall <jgrall@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:11:02 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On 23.06.2022 15:03, Julien Grall wrote:
>
>
> On 23/06/2022 13:59, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 23.06.2022 13:24, Julien Grall wrote:
>>> From: Julien Grall <jgrall@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>
>>> At the moment, corrupt() is neither checking for allocation failure
>>> nor freeing the allocated memory.
>>>
>>> Harden the code by printing ENOMEM if the allocation failed and
>>> free 'str' after the last use.
>>>
>>> This is not considered to be a security issue because corrupt() should
>>> only be called when Xenstored thinks the database is corrupted. Note
>>> that the trigger (i.e. a guest reliably provoking the call) would be
>>> a security issue.
>>>
>>> Fixes: 06d17943f0cd ("Added a basic integrity checker, and some basic
>>> ability to recover from store")
>>> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> Is this something which would want queuing for backport?
>
> I would say yes. There are a couple of more Xenstored patches I would
> consider for backporting:
>
> fe9be76d880b tools/xenstore: fix error handling of check_store()
> b977929d3646 tools/xenstore: fix hashtable_expand() zeroing new area
>
> Who is taking care of tools backport nowadays?
I'm trying to, as long as they apply cleanly enough. But I'd prefer if
rather sooner then later I could offload this again. And I'm not
actively looking to spot backporting candidates there (unlike for the
hypervisor, excluding Arm).
Jan
|
