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Re: [PATCH 03/16] x86/traps: Factor out exception_fixup() and make printing consistent

On 26.05.2020 20:06, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 12/05/2020 14:05, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> [CAUTION - EXTERNAL EMAIL] DO NOT reply, click links, or open attachments 
>> unless you have verified the sender and know the content is safe.
>> On 11.05.2020 17:14, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 04/05/2020 14:20, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 02.05.2020 00:58, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
>>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
>>>>> @@ -774,10 +774,27 @@ static void do_reserved_trap(struct cpu_user_regs 
>>>>> *regs)
>>>>>            trapnr, vec_name(trapnr), regs->error_code);
>>>>>  }
>>>>> +static bool exception_fixup(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, bool print)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +    unsigned long fixup = search_exception_table(regs);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    if ( unlikely(fixup == 0) )
>>>>> +        return false;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +    /* Can currently be triggered by guests.  Make sure we ratelimit. */
>>>>> +    if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG) && print )
>>>> I didn't think we consider dprintk()-s a possible security issue.
>>>> Why would we consider so a printk() hidden behind
>>>> IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG) wants dropping.
>>> Who said anything about a security issue?
>> The need to rate limit is (among other aspects) to prevent a
>> (logspam) security issue, isn't it?
> Rate limiting (from a security aspect) is a stopgap solution to relieve
> incidental pressure on the various global spinlocks involved.
> It specifically does not prevent a guest from trivially filling the
> console ring with junk, or for that junk to be written to
> /var/log/xen/hypervisor.log at an alarming rate, both of which are
> issues in production setups, but not security issues.

IOW you assert that e.g. XSA-141 should not have been issued?

> Technical solutions to these problems do exist, such as deleting the
> offending printk(), or maintaining per-guest console rings, but both
> come with downsides in terms of usability, which similarly impacts
> production setups.
> What ratelimiting even in debug builds gets you is a quick spate of
> printks() (e.g. any new sshd connection on an AMD system where the
> MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL patch is still uncommitted, and the default WRMSR
> behaviour breaking wrmsr_safe() logic in Linux) not wasting an
> unreasonable quantity of space in the console ring.

Hmm, okay, I can accept this perspective. Since the other comment I
gave has been taken care of by re-arrangements in a separate patch:
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>




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