[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] Xen and safety certification, Minutes of the meeting on Apr 4th



Hello Jarvis

On 22.05.18 15:08, Jarvis Roach wrote:
Hi Stefano

On 10.05.18 22:51, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
On Thu, 10 May 2018, Praveen Kumar wrote:
Yeah, you are right. It looks like turning Dom0 into a DomU is not
good enough. Maybe for this option to be viable we would actually
have to terminate (or pause and never unpause?) dom0 after boot.

Just a thought !
How about keeping Dom0 still be there, but DomUs given Dom0
privilege, with restricted permission on mission critical resources ?
And if anyhow Dom0 crashes, the best contended among the existing
DomUs take the ownership of Dom0 ?

I don't think this is easily doable, also it wouldn't solve the issue
of removing dom0 from the system. But see below.


However, you surely need an entity to handle domain crash. You
don't
want to
reboot your platform (and therefore you safety critical domain) for
a
crashed
UI, right? So how this is going to be handled in your option?

We need to understand the certification requirements better to know
the answer to this. I am guessing that UI crashes are not handled
from the certification point of view -- maybe we only need to
demonstrate that the system is not affected by them?

Where can we find the certification requirements details ?

ISO26262: https://www.iso.org/standard/51362.html
IEC61508: https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/5517

Yes, I think we need to understand the requirements better to figure
out the right way forward for Dom0.

For instance, here is another idea: we could have Xen boot multiple
domains at boot time from device tree, as suggested in the dom0-less
approach. All of the domains booted from Xen are "mission-critical".
The first domain could still be dom0. Once booted, Dom0 can start
other VMs, however, Xen would restrict Dom0 from doing any operations
affecting the first set of mission-critical domains.


Does the first domain have to be dom0? Would it be possible to have domains 
boot in parallel (especially if allocated to separate CPU cores) such that a 
simple OS (like FreeRTOS) would complete booting before dom0/Linux? In other 
words, does the hypervisor have any dependencies on dom0 having performed 
certain functions (interrupt configuration, MMU table initialization, timers, 
etc.) before it can create and start additional VMs?


We actually have one of the options to run FreeRTOS in dom0 (see earlier emails in this thread)

This way, we would get the flexibility of being able to start/stop
domains at run time, but at the same time we might still be able to
avoid certifications for Dom0, because Dom0 cannot affect the mission
critical applications.

Such dom0 shall have no mission-critical domains memory access, no HW
access (SMMU, DVFS Power, etc.), and so on. EL3 software (optee or similar
on ARM) shall also be safety certified and not controlled from dom0


Is this approach actually feasible? We need to read the requirements
to know. I am hoping Artem will chime in on this :-)
  >

I think this approach is feasible indeed, if we can prove isolation and fault
tolerance for FuSa parts of the system.

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel

 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.