[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v8 08/17] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests
>>> On 16.01.18 at 17:58, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 16/01/18 11:10, David Woodhouse wrote: >> On Fri, 2018-01-12 at 18:00 +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> @@ -152,14 +163,38 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, >>> uint64_t val) >>> { >>> const struct vcpu *curr = current; >>> struct domain *d = v->domain; >>> + const struct cpuid_policy *cp = d->arch.cpuid; >>> struct msr_domain_policy *dp = d->arch.msr; >>> struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr; >>> >>> switch ( msr ) >>> { >>> case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO: >>> + /* Read-only */ >>> goto gp_fault; >>> >>> + case MSR_SPEC_CTRL: >>> + if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb ) >>> + goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */ >>> + if ( val & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | >>> + (cp->feat.stibp ? SPEC_CTRL_STIBP : 0)) ) >> Intel defines the STIBP bit as non-faulting and ignored, even when >> STIBP isn't advertised. So you should probably just mask it out >> if !cp->feat.stibp. > > Well - this published spec finally answers several several-month-old > outstanding questions of mine. > > Time for some rewriting. /sigh In light of this, is there actually much point in me looking at the two remaining v8 patches (13 and 14)? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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