Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v8 08/17] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests

[David Woodhouse <dwmw2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Fri, 2018-01-12 at 18:00 +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> 
> @@ -152,14 +163,38 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
> uint64_t val)
>  {
>      const struct vcpu *curr = current;
>      struct domain *d = v->domain;
> +    const struct cpuid_policy *cp = d->arch.cpuid;
>      struct msr_domain_policy *dp = d->arch.msr;
>      struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr;
>  
>      switch ( msr )
>      {
>      case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO:
> +        /* Read-only */
>          goto gp_fault;
>  
> +    case MSR_SPEC_CTRL:
> +        if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb )
> +            goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */
> +        if ( val & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS |
> +                     (cp->feat.stibp ? SPEC_CTRL_STIBP : 0)) )

Intel defines the STIBP bit as non-faulting and ignored, even when
STIBP isn't advertised. So you should probably just mask it out
if !cp->feat.stibp.

> +            goto gp_fault; /* Rsvd bit set? */
> +        vp->spec_ctrl.guest = val;
> +        vp->spec_ctrl.host  = val;
> +        break;
> +

There's no actual wrmsr there. This is fine, because you're going to do
it on the way back to the guest (albeit in a later patch in the
series). But it probably warrants a comment?

Attachment: smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel