[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] Clarification regarding Meltdown and 64-bit PV guests
Hi, In <https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/04/xen-project-spectremeltdown-faq/>: "On Intel processors, only 64-bit PV mode guests can attack Xen using Variant 3. Guests running in 32-bit PV mode, HVM mode, and PVH mode (both v1 and v2) cannot attack the hypervisor using Variant 3. However, in 32-bit PV mode, HVM mode, and PVH mode (both v1 and v2), guest userspaces can attack guest kernels using Variant 3; so updating guest kernels is advisable. Interestingly, guest kernels running in 64-bit PV mode are not vulnerable to attack using Variant 3, because 64-bit PV guests already run in a KPTI-like mode." However, in multiple other places, including <https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/xsa254/README.comet> and <https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/xsa254/README.vixen>: "Note that both of these shim-based approaches prevent attacks on the host, but leave the guest vulnerable to Meltdown attacks by its own unprivileged processes; this is true even if the guest OS has KPTI or similar Meltdown mitigation." These seem to contradict each other. The FAQ seems to suggest that: - 32-bit PV guest userland processes can use Variant 3 against their own kernels and that the KPTI patch would protect against that. - Without Comet/Vixen, 64-bit PV guests can't use Variant 3 on themselves but can use it on the hypervisor, and KPTI patches in the guest do not prevent that. - Running PV guests inside Comet or Vixen prevents them making use of Variant 3, they still cannot use Variant 3 against their own kernels, and KPTI patches in the guest are not necessary. The Comet and Vixen READMEs seem to suggest that: - Use of Comet/Vixen prevents PV guests from using Variant 3 against the hypervisor (and thus other guests as well). - The guest itself remains able to use Variant 3 on its own kernel and KPTI patches inside the guest cannot prevent this. Which is correct, or have I misunderstood and they are somehow both correct? Cheers, Andy _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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