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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86: polish __{get,put}_user_{,no}check()
The primary purpose is correcting a latent bug in __get_user_check()
(the macro has no active user at present): The access_ok() check should
be before the actual access, or else any PV guest could initiate MMIO
reads with side effects.
Clean up all four macros at once:
- all arguments evaluated exactly once
- build the "check" flavor using the "nocheck" ones, instead of open
coding them
- "int" is wide enough for error codes
- name local variables without using underscores as prefixes
- avoid pointless parentheses
- add blanks after commas separating parameters or arguments
- consistently use tabs for indentation
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
This corrects the code which would have resulted in an XSA on Xen 4.2
and older, if those were still security supported. For that reason I at
least want to explore whether this is a change we want to take for 4.9.
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h
@@ -104,37 +104,35 @@ extern void __put_user_bad(void);
#define __put_user(x,ptr) \
__put_user_nocheck((__typeof__(*(ptr)))(x),(ptr),sizeof(*(ptr)))
-#define __put_user_nocheck(x,ptr,size) \
-({ \
- long __pu_err; \
- __put_user_size((x),(ptr),(size),__pu_err,-EFAULT); \
- __pu_err; \
+#define __put_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size) \
+({ \
+ int err_; \
+ __put_user_size(x, ptr, size, err_, -EFAULT); \
+ err_; \
})
-#define __put_user_check(x,ptr,size) \
+#define __put_user_check(x, ptr, size) \
({ \
- long __pu_err = -EFAULT; \
- __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__pu_addr = (ptr); \
- if (access_ok(__pu_addr,size)) \
- __put_user_size((x),__pu_addr,(size),__pu_err,-EFAULT); \
- __pu_err; \
+ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *ptr_ = (ptr); \
+ __typeof__(size) size_ = (size); \
+ access_ok(ptr_, size_) ? __put_user_nocheck(x, ptr_, size_) \
+ : -EFAULT; \
})
-#define __get_user_nocheck(x,ptr,size) \
-({ \
- long __gu_err; \
- __get_user_size((x),(ptr),(size),__gu_err,-EFAULT); \
- __gu_err; \
+#define __get_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size) \
+({ \
+ int err_; \
+ __get_user_size(x, ptr, size, err_, -EFAULT); \
+ err_; \
})
-#define __get_user_check(x,ptr,size) \
-({ \
- long __gu_err; \
- __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__gu_addr = (ptr); \
- __get_user_size((x),__gu_addr,(size),__gu_err,-EFAULT); \
- if (!access_ok(__gu_addr,size)) __gu_err = -EFAULT; \
- __gu_err; \
-})
+#define __get_user_check(x, ptr, size) \
+({ \
+ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *ptr_ = (ptr); \
+ __typeof__(size) size_ = (size); \
+ access_ok(ptr_, size_) ? __get_user_nocheck(x, ptr_, size_) \
+ : -EFAULT; \
+})
struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
#define __m(x) (*(const struct __large_struct *)(x))
Attachment:
x86-get-put-user.patch _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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