Re: [Xen-devel] Device model operation hypercall (DMOP, re qemu depriv)

[Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Jan Beulich writes ("Re: Device model operation hypercall (DMOP, re qemu 
depriv)"):
> On 15.08.16 at 12:47, <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > What about including in the "fixed" part of the hypercall a virtual
> > address range that all pointers must be in?  That wouldn't even require
> > a user/kernel flag actually; and could conceivably be used by the caller
> > (either userspace or kernel space) to thwart certain kinds of potential
> > attacks.
> 
> That's definitely an option, if we're sufficiently certain that no OSes
> will ever require two or more ranges.

How hard would it be to allow the caller to specify several allowable
ranges ?

Note that the hypercall argument construction code in libxc already
has to handle all hypercall argument memory specially, so libxc could
automatically build a list of the arguments' memory addresses.

What would be needed is some kind of restriction on (or variant of)
copy_* which double-checked against the list provided in the
non-op-specific part of the hypercall.

Ian.

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel