[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Device model operation hypercall (DMOP, re qemu depriv)
>>> On 03.08.16 at 18:10, <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > George Dunlap writes ("Re: Device model operation hypercall (DMOP, re qemu > depriv)"): >> So before qemu devpriv can be usable, *all* the HVMCTL operations would >> need to be audited, and those that were deemed insecure would need to be >> either fixed or removed. > > Even worse, the bad HVMCTLs would be retrospectively turned into > security-bugs-in-old-hypervisors. I don't think this is tenable. How would a bug in the respective current hvmop then not be a security issue as well? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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