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Re: [Xen-devel] Device model operation hypercall (DMOP, re qemu depriv)



>>> On 03.08.16 at 18:10, <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> George Dunlap writes ("Re: Device model operation hypercall (DMOP, re qemu 
> depriv)"):
>> So before qemu devpriv can be usable, *all* the HVMCTL operations would
>> need to be audited, and those that were deemed insecure would need to be
>> either fixed or removed.
> 
> Even worse, the bad HVMCTLs would be retrospectively turned into
> security-bugs-in-old-hypervisors.  I don't think this is tenable.

How would a bug in the respective current hvmop then not be a
security issue as well?

Jan


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