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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 5/8] x86/vm-event/monitor: don't compromise monitor_write_data on domain cleanup
On 07/01/16 09:56, Corneliu ZUZU wrote:
> On 7/1/2016 9:47 AM, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> On 06/30/16 21:45, Corneliu ZUZU wrote:
>>> The arch_vm_event structure is dynamically allocated and freed @
>>> vm_event_cleanup_domain. This cleanup is triggered e.g. when the
>>> toolstack user
>>> disables domain monitoring (xc_monitor_disable), which in turn
>>> effectively
>>> discards any information that was in arch_vm_event.write_data.
>>>
>>> But this can yield unexpected behavior since if a CR-write was
>>> awaiting to be
>>> committed on the scheduling tail
>>> (hvm_do_resume->arch_monitor_write_data)
>>> before xc_monitor_disable is called, then the domain CR write is
>>> wrongfully
>>> ignored, which of course, in these cases, can easily render a domain
>>> crash.
>>>
>>> To fix the issue, this patch makes only arch_vm_event.emul_read_data
>>> dynamically
>>> allocated instead of the whole arch_vm_event structure. With this we
>>> can avoid
>>> invalidation of an awaiting arch_vm_event.write_data by selectively
>>> cleaning up
>>> only emul_read_data and emulate_flags @ vm_event_cleanup_domain.
>>>
>>> Small note: arch_vm_event structure definition needed to be moved from
>>> asm-x86/vm_event.h to asm-x86/domain.h in the process.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Corneliu ZUZU <czuzu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>> xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 5 ++--
>>> xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c | 8 +++---
>>> xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 62
>>> ++++++++++++++++++------------------------
>>> xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 4 +--
>>> xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 7 +----
>>> xen/arch/x86/vm_event.c | 16 +++++------
>>> xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 42 +++++++++++++++++-----------
>>> xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h | 3 +-
>>> xen/include/asm-x86/vm_event.h | 10 -------
>>> 9 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
>>> index bb59247..06e68ae 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
>>> @@ -492,8 +492,9 @@ int vcpu_initialise(struct vcpu *v)
>>> void vcpu_destroy(struct vcpu *v)
>>> {
>>> - xfree(v->arch.vm_event);
>>> - v->arch.vm_event = NULL;
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags = 0;
>>> + xfree(v->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data);
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data = NULL;
>>> if ( is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v) )
>>> {
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
>>> index 855af4d..68f5515 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
>>> @@ -73,12 +73,12 @@ static int set_context_data(void *buffer,
>>> unsigned int size)
>>> {
>>> struct vcpu *curr = current;
>>> - if ( curr->arch.vm_event )
>>> + if ( curr->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data )
>>> {
>>> unsigned int safe_size =
>>> - min(size, curr->arch.vm_event->emul_read_data.size);
>>> + min(size, curr->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data->size);
>>> - memcpy(buffer, curr->arch.vm_event->emul_read_data.data,
>>> safe_size);
>>> + memcpy(buffer, curr->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data->data,
>>> safe_size);
>>> memset(buffer + safe_size, 0, size - safe_size);
>>> return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>>> }
>>> @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static int hvmemul_virtual_to_linear(
>>> * vm_event being triggered for repeated writes to a whole page.
>>> */
>>> if (
>>> unlikely(current->domain->arch.mem_access_emulate_each_rep) &&
>>> - current->arch.vm_event->emulate_flags != 0 )
>>> + current->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags != 0 )
>>> max_reps = 1;
>>> /*
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>>> index 884ae40..03dffb8 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>>> @@ -473,24 +473,24 @@ void hvm_do_resume(struct vcpu *v)
>>> if ( !handle_hvm_io_completion(v) )
>>> return;
>>> - if ( unlikely(v->arch.vm_event) )
>>> + if ( unlikely(v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags) )
>>> {
>>> - if ( v->arch.vm_event->emulate_flags )
>>> - {
>>> - enum emul_kind kind = EMUL_KIND_NORMAL;
>>> + enum emul_kind kind;
>>> - if ( v->arch.vm_event->emulate_flags &
>>> - VM_EVENT_FLAG_SET_EMUL_READ_DATA )
>>> - kind = EMUL_KIND_SET_CONTEXT;
>>> - else if ( v->arch.vm_event->emulate_flags &
>>> - VM_EVENT_FLAG_EMULATE_NOWRITE )
>>> - kind = EMUL_KIND_NOWRITE;
>>> + ASSERT(v->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data);
>>> - hvm_mem_access_emulate_one(kind, TRAP_invalid_op,
>>> - HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE);
>>> + kind = EMUL_KIND_NORMAL;
>> Why do the "kind = EMUL_KIND_NORMAL;" assignment separately after the
>> ASSERT()? Could it not be left the same way as before ("enum emul_kind
>> kind = EMUL_KIND_NORMAL;") above the ASSERT()?
>>
>> It's not a big change and I won't hold the patch over it, but small
>> changes add up in the review process so unnecessary changes are best
>> either avoided, or done in a standalone cleanup patch.
>>
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->emulate_flags = 0;
>>> - }
>>> + if ( v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags &
>>> VM_EVENT_FLAG_SET_EMUL_READ_DATA )
>>> + kind = EMUL_KIND_SET_CONTEXT;
>>> + else if ( v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags &
>>> + VM_EVENT_FLAG_EMULATE_NOWRITE )
>>> + kind = EMUL_KIND_NOWRITE;
>>> +
>>> + hvm_mem_access_emulate_one(kind, TRAP_invalid_op,
>>> + HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE);
>>> +
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags = 0;
>>> }
>>> arch_monitor_write_data(v);
>>> @@ -2178,17 +2178,15 @@ int hvm_set_cr0(unsigned long value, bool_t
>>> may_defer)
>>> if ( may_defer &&
>>> unlikely(v->domain->arch.monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled &
>>>
>>> monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask(VM_EVENT_X86_CR0)) )
>>> {
>>> - ASSERT(v->arch.vm_event);
>>> -
>>> if ( hvm_monitor_crX(CR0, value, old_value) )
>>> {
>>> /*
>>> * The actual write will occur in
>>> arch_monitor_write_data(), if
>>> * permitted.
>>> */
>>> - ASSERT(MWS_NOWRITE == v->arch.vm_event->write_data.status);
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->write_data.status = MWS_CR0;
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->write_data.value = value;
>>> + ASSERT(MWS_NOWRITE == v->arch.vm_event.write_data.status);
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.write_data.status = MWS_CR0;
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.write_data.value = value;
>>> return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>>> }
>>> @@ -2284,17 +2282,15 @@ int hvm_set_cr3(unsigned long value, bool_t
>>> may_defer)
>>> if ( may_defer &&
>>> unlikely(v->domain->arch.monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled &
>>>
>>> monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask(VM_EVENT_X86_CR3)) )
>>> {
>>> - ASSERT(v->arch.vm_event);
>>> -
>>> if ( hvm_monitor_crX(CR3, value, old) )
>>> {
>>> /*
>>> * The actual write will occur in
>>> arch_monitor_write_data(), if
>>> * permitted.
>>> */
>>> - ASSERT(MWS_NOWRITE == v->arch.vm_event->write_data.status);
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->write_data.status = MWS_CR3;
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->write_data.value = value;
>>> + ASSERT(MWS_NOWRITE == v->arch.vm_event.write_data.status);
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.write_data.status = MWS_CR3;
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.write_data.value = value;
>>> return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>>> }
>>> @@ -2368,17 +2364,15 @@ int hvm_set_cr4(unsigned long value, bool_t
>>> may_defer)
>>> if ( may_defer &&
>>> unlikely(v->domain->arch.monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled &
>>>
>>> monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask(VM_EVENT_X86_CR4)) )
>>> {
>>> - ASSERT(v->arch.vm_event);
>>> -
>>> if ( hvm_monitor_crX(CR4, value, old_cr) )
>>> {
>>> /*
>>> * The actual write will occur in
>>> arch_monitor_write_data(), if
>>> * permitted.
>>> */
>>> - ASSERT(MWS_NOWRITE == v->arch.vm_event->write_data.status);
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->write_data.status = MWS_CR4;
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->write_data.value = value;
>>> + ASSERT(MWS_NOWRITE == v->arch.vm_event.write_data.status);
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.write_data.status = MWS_CR4;
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.write_data.value = value;
>>> return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>>> }
>>> @@ -3753,16 +3747,14 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr,
>>> uint64_t msr_content,
>>> if ( may_defer && unlikely(monitored_msr(v->domain, msr)) )
>>> {
>>> - ASSERT(v->arch.vm_event);
>>> -
>>> /*
>>> * The actual write will occur in
>>> arch_monitor_write_data(), if
>>> * permitted.
>>> */
>>> - ASSERT(MWS_NOWRITE == v->arch.vm_event->write_data.status);
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->write_data.status = MWS_MSR;
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->write_data.msr = msr;
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->write_data.value = msr_content;
>>> + ASSERT(MWS_NOWRITE == v->arch.vm_event.write_data.status);
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.write_data.status = MWS_MSR;
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.write_data.msr = msr;
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.write_data.value = msr_content;
>>> hvm_monitor_msr(msr, msr_content);
>>> return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
>>> index 16733a4..9bcaa8a 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
>>> @@ -1639,10 +1639,10 @@ void p2m_mem_access_emulate_check(struct vcpu
>>> *v,
>>> }
>>> }
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->emulate_flags = violation ? rsp->flags : 0;
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags = violation ? rsp->flags : 0;
>>> if ( (rsp->flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_SET_EMUL_READ_DATA) )
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->emul_read_data =
>>> rsp->data.emul_read_data;
>>> + *v->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data =
>>> rsp->data.emul_read_data;
>>> }
>>> }
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
>>> index 5c8d4da..88d14ae 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/monitor.c
>>> @@ -46,12 +46,7 @@ void arch_monitor_cleanup_domain(struct domain *d)
>>> void arch_monitor_write_data(struct vcpu *v)
>>> {
>>> - struct monitor_write_data *w;
>>> -
>>> - if ( likely(!v->arch.vm_event) )
>>> - return;
>>> -
>>> - w = &v->arch.vm_event->write_data;
>>> + struct monitor_write_data *w = &v->arch.vm_event.write_data;
>>> if ( likely(MWS_NOWRITE == w->status) )
>>> return;
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/vm_event.c b/xen/arch/x86/vm_event.c
>>> index 825da48..f21ff10 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/vm_event.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/vm_event.c
>>> @@ -30,12 +30,13 @@ int vm_event_init_domain(struct domain *d)
>>> for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
>>> {
>>> - if ( v->arch.vm_event )
>>> + if ( v->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data )
>>> continue;
>>> - v->arch.vm_event = xzalloc(struct arch_vm_event);
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data =
>>> + xzalloc(struct vm_event_emul_read_data);
>>> - if ( !v->arch.vm_event )
>>> + if ( !v->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data )
>>> return -ENOMEM;
>>> }
>>> @@ -52,8 +53,9 @@ void vm_event_cleanup_domain(struct domain *d)
>>> for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
>>> {
>>> - xfree(v->arch.vm_event);
>>> - v->arch.vm_event = NULL;
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.emulate_flags = 0;
>>> + xfree(v->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data);
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data = NULL;
>>> }
>>> d->arch.mem_access_emulate_each_rep = 0;
>>> @@ -73,13 +75,11 @@ void vm_event_register_write_resume(struct vcpu
>>> *v, vm_event_response_t *rsp)
>>> {
>>> if ( rsp->flags & VM_EVENT_FLAG_DENY )
>>> {
>>> - ASSERT(v->arch.vm_event);
>>> -
>>> /* deny flag requires the vCPU to be paused */
>>> if ( !atomic_read(&v->vm_event_pause_count) )
>>> return;
>>> - v->arch.vm_event->write_data.status = MWS_NOWRITE;
>>> + v->arch.vm_event.write_data.status = MWS_NOWRITE;
>>> }
>>> }
>>> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
>>> b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
>>> index a22ee6b..7ea5c8f 100644
>>> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
>>> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
>>> @@ -259,21 +259,6 @@ struct pv_domain
>>> struct cpuidmasks *cpuidmasks;
>>> };
>>> -enum monitor_write_status
>>> -{
>>> - MWS_NOWRITE = 0,
>>> - MWS_MSR,
>>> - MWS_CR0,
>>> - MWS_CR3,
>>> - MWS_CR4,
>>> -};
>>> -
>>> -struct monitor_write_data {
>>> - enum monitor_write_status status;
>>> - uint32_t msr;
>>> - uint64_t value;
>>> -};
>>> -
>>> struct arch_domain
>>> {
>>> struct page_info *perdomain_l3_pg;
>>> @@ -496,6 +481,31 @@ typedef enum __packed {
>>> SMAP_CHECK_DISABLED, /* disable the check */
>>> } smap_check_policy_t;
>>> +enum monitor_write_status
>>> +{
>>> + MWS_NOWRITE = 0,
>>> + MWS_MSR,
>>> + MWS_CR0,
>>> + MWS_CR3,
>>> + MWS_CR4,
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +struct monitor_write_data {
>>> + enum monitor_write_status status;
>>> + uint32_t msr;
>>> + uint64_t value;
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +/*
>>> + * Should we emulate the next matching instruction on VCPU resume
>>> + * after a vm_event?
>>> + */
>>> +struct arch_vm_event {
>>> + uint32_t emulate_flags;
>>> + struct vm_event_emul_read_data *emul_read_data;
>>> + struct monitor_write_data write_data;
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> struct arch_vcpu
>>> {
>>> /*
>>> @@ -569,7 +579,7 @@ struct arch_vcpu
>>> /* A secondary copy of the vcpu time info. */
>>> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(vcpu_time_info_t) time_info_guest;
>>> - struct arch_vm_event *vm_event;
>>> + struct arch_vm_event vm_event;
>>> };
>>> smap_check_policy_t smap_policy_change(struct vcpu *v,
>>> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
>>> b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
>>> index 1068376..984ac4c 100644
>>> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
>>> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
>>> @@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ int arch_monitor_domctl_op(struct domain *d, struct
>>> xen_domctl_monitor_op *mop)
>>> * Enabling mem_access_emulate_each_rep without a vm_event
>>> subscriber
>>> * is meaningless.
>>> */
>>> - if ( d->max_vcpus && d->vcpu[0] && d->vcpu[0]->arch.vm_event )
>>> + if ( d->max_vcpus && d->vcpu[0] &&
>>> + d->vcpu[0]->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data )
>> Again, I won't hold the patch over this, but if there are additional
>> reviews that require changes and cause another version of it, please add
>> a small line to the comment above the if, stating that emul_read_data
>> only gets allocated when vm_event gets enabled, otherwise (especially
>> for newcomers) that check might look confusing.
>>
>> Otherwise:
>>
>> Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Razvan
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Xen-devel mailing list
>> Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
>
> Since that came up wouldn't it be even nicer if we add a:
>
> #define vm_event_initialized_on_vcpu(v) (NULL !=
> (v)->arch.vm_event.emul_read_data)
>
> in asm-x86/vm_event.h above vm_event_init_domain and use that everywhere
> instead?
Yes, I think that's the best way to go about that.
Thanks,
Razvan
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