Thanks for the reply, but I'm not sure I understand.
Ignore memory sharing for now...
Are you saying, yes, the ownership check IS performed?
E.g. if gpfn is a random number, NULL will always be
returned (unless of course the random number happens
to be a valid gfn for current->domain)?
Or are you saying its plausible that this IS the problem
(that I am not checking for ownership)?
Now bring memory sharing back in...
Since tmem and memory sharing are supposed to be complementary
(though I don't think anybody has ever tried using both
together), are you saying I should change this one
call from gfn_to_mfn() to gfn_to_mfn_unshare() for
some reason (e.g. maybe to avoid a race)? Note
that this code is just getting a virtual address
to copy a page to/from the guest.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Keir Fraser [mailto:keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Friday, September 17, 2010 10:35 AM
> To: Dan Magenheimer; Jan Beulich
> Cc: Xen-devel
> Subject: Re: xen crash in tmem: checking a xen pfn for domain ownership
> If you could be doing memory sharing then you might need to use
> gfn_to_mfn_unshare()? Otherwise it looks pretty plausible, and that one
> is pretty minor as you're probably not using memshr.
> -- Keir
> On 17/09/2010 17:29, "Dan Magenheimer" <dan.magenheimer@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Does the construct:
> > xen_pfn_t gpfn;
> > p2m_type_t t;
> > unsigned long mfn;
> > mfn = mfn_x(gfn_to_mfn(current->domain, gpfn, &t));
> > if (t != p2m_ram_rw || cli_mfn == INVALID_MFN)
> > return NULL; /* bad */
> > return map_domain_page(mfn)
> > somehow check to ensure that pfn belongs to current->domain?
> > (See cli_mfn_to_va() in common/tmem_xen.c.)
> > If not, is there an easy way to perform that check?
> > (preferably one that works for both HVM and PV guests)
> > In debugging a tmem Linux-side guest patch, I discovered
> > that a bad mfn passed by the guest can crash Xen and
> > I think this assumption might be the problem.
> > Thanks,
> > Dan
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