On Sun, 13 Mar 2005, Kurt Garloff wrote:
> On Sun, Mar 06, 2005 at 04:14:24PM -0500, Rik van Riel wrote:
> > On Sun, 6 Mar 2005, Tommi Virtanen wrote:
> > > That's not good design. I sincerely think access to any confidential
> > > or security conscious part of xen should be limited, e.g. with a
> > > unix domain socket located in a directory only readable by a certain
> > > group.
> > Good point, then we could use filesystem permissions
> > and/or selinux policy to restrict who gets access to
> > xend.
> Why not just require the other end of the socket to be below 1024?
> If you bind to localhost, that should be enough.
Because the ability to open connections from ports < 1024
is a capability, which can be retained by daemons after
dropping the other root privileges.
> Using an selinux policy for this would be aiming cannons at sparrows
> (german saying, in english that's breaking a fly on the wheel).
Don't forget to read the filesystem permissions part ;)
SELinux policy won't be required, it just could be used
as a further restriction beyond that offered by the
"Debugging is twice as hard as writing the code in the first place.
Therefore, if you write the code as cleverly as possible, you are,
by definition, not smart enough to debug it." - Brian W. Kernighan
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