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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v10 1/1] xen/riscv: probe the A/D update scheme if the DT advertises neither
On 2026-10-28 14:24 +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 28/10/2026 1:05 pm, Baptiste Le Duc wrote:
> > diff --git a/xen/arch/riscv/cpufeature.c b/xen/arch/riscv/cpufeature.c
> > index 3d5bbd2228..83d3bc5ddc 100644
> > --- a/xen/arch/riscv/cpufeature.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/cpufeature.c
> > @@ -630,6 +632,53 @@ const char *get_guest_isa_str(void)
> > return guest_isa_str;
> > }
> >
> > +/*
> > + * Probe whether hardware updates the PTE A/D bits by reading through an
> > alias
> > + * mapping whose A and D bits are clear. Observing A set, even by a
> > speculative
> > + * access, implies Svadu, as Svade only allows A to be set by software.
> > + *
> > + * Under Svade, the read raises a page fault instead, so use the extable to
> > + * handle it.
>
> This is an internal detail, which can be covered by an internal comment.
>
> > + */
> > +static bool __init probe_hw_ad_update(void)
> > +{
> > + vaddr_t va = FIXMAP_ADDR(FIX_MISC);
> > + pte_t *entry = &xen_fixmap[FIX_MISC];
> > + bool a_set = false;
> > +
> > + ASSERT(!pte_is_valid(*entry));
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * set_fixmap() can't be used, as pt_update_entry() always sets A and
> > D.
> > + *
> > + * A and D belong to the PTE, not to the page, so a new PTE with A and
> > D
> > + * clear can point to any RAM page, whatever its other mappings. Use
> > the
> > + * first page of the Xen image, and map it read-only so that Xen can't
> > be
> > + * corrupted through this alias.
>
> The function comment is mostly ok, but this one is misleading, not least
> because it talks about corruption despite this being a read operation.
> All you need to say here is:
>
> /* Opencode set_fixmap() to intentionally leave A/D clear. */
>
>
> > + */
> > + write_pte(entry, pte_from_mfn(maddr_to_mfn(virt_to_maddr(_start)),
>
> pte_from_mfn(virt_to_mfn(_start))
I didn't use that, as it would require adding
```
/* Override macros from asm/page.h to make them work with mfn_t */
#undef virt_to_mfn
#define virt_to_mfn(v) _mfn(__virt_to_mfn(v))
```
as other archs do. But if you think it's worth it for a single usage, then
I could do it.
>
> > + PTE_VALID | PTE_READABLE));
> > + flush_tlb_one_local(va);
> > +
>
> /* Read from the alias, handling pagefault */
Will apply that in v11.
>
> > + asm_inline goto (
> > + "1: lw zero, 0(%[va])\n"
> > + ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[out])
> > + :
> > + : [va] "r" (va)
> > + : "memory"
> > + : out );
> > +
> > + /* Order the load, and so its A bit update, before reading the PTE */
>
> /* Check to see if hardware set A. */
It doesn't explain the fence, but mine doesn't either. If you think it
doesn't matter, then I will use what you propose in v11.
>
> > + RISCV_FENCE(r, r);
> > + a_set = read_pte(entry).pte & PTE_ACCESSED;
> > +
> > + out:
>
> It's better to name this label 'fault' because that's what happened to
> use it.
>
> What happens if you neither fault, and A doesn't get set? Right now
> you'll report Svade despite there being no fault.
I don't know if such a case is allowed by the spec, but afaiu, and we
talked a lot about that with Jan B and Oleksii, if we don't fault then
we should report Svade.
>
> You might or might not care to cover this case; that's up to the RISC-V
> maintainers as to how likely it is to encounter in real life.
I'm waiting for Jan B's and Oleksii's opinion on that point.
>
> But, if you do want to handle it, then you want something like
>
> asm goto (...);
>
> if ( 0 )
> {
> fault:
> got_fault = true;
> }
>
> ...
>
> if ( !got_fault && !a_set )
> panic("Neither Svade nor Svadu !?!\n");
>
>
> The if (0) is a bit ugly but it's the only way to avoid needing a second
> label.
>
> > + write_pte(entry, (pte_t){});
> > + flush_tlb_one_local(va);
> > +
> > + return a_set;
> > +}
> > +
> > void __init riscv_fill_hwcap(void)
> > {
> > unsigned int i;
> > @@ -674,6 +723,28 @@ void __init riscv_fill_hwcap(void)
> > "Zihintpause unavailable: cpu_relax() gives the CPU no
> > hint; "
> > "wire up this platform's pause equivalent in
> > cpu_relax()\n");
> >
> > + /*
> > + * The privileged spec allows exactly two schemes for updating the PTE
> > A
> > + * and D bits:
> > + * 1) hardware sets them on access and on write;
> > + * 2) accessing a page whose A and/or D bit is clear raises a page
> > fault,
> > + * so that software can set them (ratified as Svade).
> > + *
> > + * Every implementation uses one of them, but may predate the
> > extensions
> > + * and advertise neither. In that case, trust the hardware probe.
> > + */
> > + if ( !riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, RISCV_ISA_EXT_svade) &&
> > + !riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, RISCV_ISA_EXT_svadu) )
> > + {
> > + bool hw_update = probe_hw_ad_update();
> > +
> > + __set_bit(hw_update ? RISCV_ISA_EXT_svadu : RISCV_ISA_EXT_svade,
> > + riscv_isa);
> > + printk(XENLOG_WARNING
> > + "Device tree advertises neither Svade nor Svadu, probed %s:
> > add it to \"riscv,isa\"\n",
> > + hw_update ? "svadu" : "svade");
>
> This is overly verbose, including details that absolutely shouldn't be
> the boot log.
>
> "Neither Svade nor Svadu in Device Tree - probed as %s\n"
I agree with Jan on the point that it doesn't give any hint to the user.
What do you think of this shorter version:
"Svade/Svadu missing from \"riscv,isa\" - probed as %s\n"
--
Baptiste Le Duc <baptiste.le-duc@xxxxxxxxxx>
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