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Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] vpci/msix: separate out common MSI-X code


  • To: Mykyta Poturai <Mykyta_Poturai@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 09:58:56 +0100
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  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@xxxxxxx>, Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@xxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 08:59:06 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 28.10.2026 09:43, Mykyta Poturai wrote:
> On 10/27/26 12:21 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 27.10.2026 10:39, Mykyta Poturai wrote:
>>> On 10/26/26 2:34 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 26.10.2026 13:27, Mykyta Poturai wrote:
>>>>> This is preparatory work to make vPCI MSI-X functional on Arm. Split the
>>>>> vPCI MSI-X code so that intercepting the MSI-X table and PBA stays x86
>>>>> only,
>>>>
>>>> This likely is related to peculiarities of Arm's interrupt handling, yet
>>>> on the surface I can't see why not intercepting MSI-X table accesses
>>>> would be safe. Would it be possible to extend background here a little?
>>>
>>> On Arm most of the work is done by the ITS, so the only thing the device
>>> needs to write to the doorbell register is the EventID. Interrupt
>>> translation is fully configured in the ITS; it will reject invalid
>>> EventIDs and also has a sideband DeviceID, so misconfigured devices
>>> cannot trigger each other's interrupts. Memory-wise everything is gated
>>> by the IOMMU, so a wrong doorbell address would not pose any risk either.
>>
>> And a guest fiddling with the mask bits behind Xen's back isn't a problem
>> either?
> 
> No. Masking/unmasking an interrupt the guest has already mapped is just 
> the guest doing its own configuration. Unmasking an unmapped interrupt 
> will result in it being discarded by the ITS. So I don't see a problem 
> here either.

IOW unlike on x86, on Arm Xen never has a need to (transiently) mask an
interrupt that the guest wants / considers unmasked?

Jan



 


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