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[PATCH] x86: invoke xenheap_max_mfn() unconditionally


  • To: "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 13:11:56 +0200
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  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <gwd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 11:12:05 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

Calling the function only conditionally can, when highmem_start isn't set
and when hotplugged memory appears above the boundary where the "short"
directmap ends, result in Xenheap allocations to yield memory which isn't
accessible through the "short" directmap. Accesses from PV guest context
would then either fault or access guest controlled memory.

With this the bifurcation done by 88e3ed61642b ("x86/NUMA: make
init_node_heap() respect Xen heap limit") can also be undone:
end_boot_allocator() can be called from a single place, and system_state
is bumped right afterwards.

Fixes: adc5afbf1c70 ("x86: support up to 16Tb")
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5.5
Reported-by: George Dunlap <gwd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -1908,16 +1908,17 @@ if(j == 1/*bm->kind == BOOTMOD_RAMDISK*/
 
     numa_initmem_init(0, raw_max_page);
 
+    if ( !highmem_start )
+        xenheap_max_mfn(virt_to_mfn(HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END - 1));
+
+    end_boot_allocator();
+    system_state = SYS_STATE_boot;
+
     if ( max_page - 1 > virt_to_mfn(HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END - 1) )
     {
         unsigned long lo = virt_to_mfn(HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END - 1);
         uint64_t mask = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
 
-        if ( !highmem_start )
-            xenheap_max_mfn(lo);
-
-        end_boot_allocator();
-
         /* Pass the remaining memory in (lo, max_page) to the allocator. */
         for ( i = 0; i < boot_e820.nr_map; i++ )
         {
@@ -1936,10 +1937,6 @@ if(j == 1/*bm->kind == BOOTMOD_RAMDISK*/
             init_domheap_pages(s, e);
         }
     }
-    else
-        end_boot_allocator();
-
-    system_state = SYS_STATE_boot;
 
     bsp_stack = cpu_alloc_stack(0); /* Needs to know IDT vs FRED */
     if ( !bsp_stack )



 


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