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Re: [PATCH v2 22/39] xen/riscv: add guest memory read helper
- To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- From: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 16:29:00 +0200
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- Cc: Romain Caritey <Romain.Caritey@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Baptiste Le Duc <baptiste.le-duc@xxxxxxxxxx>, Zheng Zhang <zhangzheng@xxxxxxxxxxx>, Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx>, Connor Davis <connojdavis@xxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Delivery-date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 14:29:16 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On 9/11/26 4:00 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 11.09.2026 15:57, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
On 9/10/26 5:28 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 27.08.2026 17:21, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
@@ -114,3 +115,89 @@ unsigned long copy_to_guest_phys(struct domain *d, paddr_t
gpa, void *buf,
return copy_guest(buf, gpa, len, GPA_INFO(d),
COPY_to_guest | COPY_gpa);
}
+
+/*
+ * Read machine word from guest memory
+ *
+ * @guest_addr: Guest address to read
+ * @read_insn: Flag representing whether we are reading instruction
+ * @trap: Output pointer to trap details if something went wrong during read
+ *
+ * The hlv/hlvx instructions translate guest_addr through the live
+ * vsatp/hgatp CSRs, so the read is only meaningful for the address
+ * space of the currently running vCPU.
+ *
+ * At most two halfwords are fetched when @read_insn is true, i.e. encodings
+ * wider than 32 bits are not supported. Such an encoding cannot be completed
+ * by calling this function again at @guest_addr + 4: the length check is
+ * applied to the first halfword read, which would then be a continuation of
+ * the instruction rather than its opcode. It is up to the caller to reject
+ * anything that is neither a 16- nor a 32-bit encoding.
+ */
+unsigned long riscv_read_guest(unsigned long guest_addr, bool read_insn,
+ struct trap_info *trap)
+{
+ /*
+ * Poison the result: if the very first access faults, the fixup skips
+ * over the loads without writing it. Callers must check trap->scause.
+ */
+ unsigned long val = ~0UL, tmp;
+
+ /*
+ * hlv/hlvx use hstatus.SPVP for the privilege of the access, and the
+ * live vsatp/hgatp for the translation. Xen never installs a value of
+ * its own in hstatus (it is only saved on trap entry and restored
+ * before sret) and it doesn't reschedule before returning to the
+ * guest, so all three still belong to the vCPU which trapped.
+ *
+ * Check the saved copy rather than the live CSR: a nested trap taken
+ * from HS-mode clears hstatus.SPV in the CSR (but leaves SPVP alone).
+ */
+ ASSERT(vcpu_guest_cpu_user_regs(current)->hstatus & HSTATUS_SPV);
[...]
Question being of how much value
that checking is: vcpu_guest_cpu_user_regs(current)->hstatus can't possibly
have SPV clear, can it? Only nested exception frames could.
Given that vcpu_guest_cpu_user_regs(current)->hstatus will always have
SPV set for any valid guest trap frame, the ASSERT is purely a defensive
sanity check to ensure riscv_read_guest() is never called outside a
guest trap context.
It is not, afaict: vcpu_guest_cpu_user_regs(current) will give you the guest
frame no matter what context you're in. For what you want, you'd need to
pass struct cpu_user_regs * into here.
Agree, struct cpu_user_regs * will be required.
But I am looking at how read_guest() is used and it shouldn't be used
when nested HS trap happen never and it seems like it is too much to
pass struct cpu_user_regs * just to check that.
I think it is enough just to have:
case CAUSE_FETCH_GUEST_PAGE_FAULT:
case CAUSE_LOAD_GUEST_PAGE_FAULT:
case CAUSE_STORE_GUEST_PAGE_FAULT:
/*
* A guest page fault taken in Xen context comes from an hlv/hlvx
* access made on a vCPU's behalf and is dealt with by the
* fixup_exception() above, so only a guest can get here.
*/
BUG_ON(!from_guest);
where we already checked that when riscv_read_guest() is used then it
isn't nested HS trap.
So it looks like we could just drop the ASSERT() and probably update the
comment above function and mention that riscv_read_guest() shouldn't be
called in nested HS trap.
~ Oleksii
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