[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [PATCH v2 22/39] xen/riscv: add guest memory read helper
- To: Baptiste Le Duc <baptiste.le-duc@xxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 15:06:21 +0200
- Authentication-results: eu.smtp.expurgate.cloud; dkim=pass header.s=20251104 header.d=gmail.com header.i="@gmail.com" header.h="Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:In-Reply-To:From:Content-Language:References:Cc:To:Subject:User-Agent:MIME-Version:Date:Message-ID"
- Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Romain Caritey <Romain.Caritey@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Zheng Zhang <zhangzheng@xxxxxxxxxxx>, Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx>, Connor Davis <connojdavis@xxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 13:06:25 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On 9/9/26 2:04 PM, Baptiste Le Duc wrote:
Introduce riscv_read_guest() to allow Xen to safely read guest memory
using HLV/HLVX instructions while reliably capturing trap context.
This is required for instruction fetch emulation and MMIO decoding, where
Xen must inspect guest memory that may not be directly accessible and may
fault.
The implementation is based on kvm_riscv_vcpu_unpriv_read() from Linux,
with one deviation: the hlv/hlvx instructions translate the guest address
through the live vsatp/hgatp CSRs, i.e. through the address space of the
currently running vCPU, so the function can only be called safely for
current. Instead of taking a struct vcpu argument, it always operates on
current directly.
Signed-off-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
diff --git a/xen/arch/riscv/guestcopy.c b/xen/arch/riscv/guestcopy.c
index 8a89212e0b..b2327822ac 100644
--- a/xen/arch/riscv/guestcopy.c
+++ b/xen/arch/riscv/guestcopy.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <xen/string.h>
#include <asm/guest_access.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
#define COPY_from_guest 0U
#define COPY_to_guest BIT(0, U)
@@ -114,3 +115,89 @@ unsigned long copy_to_guest_phys(struct domain *d, paddr_t
gpa, void *buf,
return copy_guest(buf, gpa, len, GPA_INFO(d),
COPY_to_guest | COPY_gpa);
}
+
+/*
+ * Read machine word from guest memory
+ *
+ * @guest_addr: Guest address to read
+ * @read_insn: Flag representing whether we are reading instruction
+ * @trap: Output pointer to trap details if something went wrong during read
+ *
+ * The hlv/hlvx instructions translate guest_addr through the live
+ * vsatp/hgatp CSRs, so the read is only meaningful for the address
+ * space of the currently running vCPU.
+ *
+ * At most two halfwords are fetched when @read_insn is true, i.e. encodings
+ * wider than 32 bits are not supported. Such an encoding cannot be completed
+ * by calling this function again at @guest_addr + 4: the length check is
+ * applied to the first halfword read, which would then be a continuation of
+ * the instruction rather than its opcode. It is up to the caller to reject
+ * anything that is neither a 16- nor a 32-bit encoding.
+ */
+unsigned long riscv_read_guest(unsigned long guest_addr, bool read_insn,
+ struct trap_info *trap)
Nit: every other function in this file / declared in this header
(raw_copy_from_guest, copy_to_guest_phys, ...) has no riscv_ prefix. Why
does this one get it?
Agree not to much sense. I will drop it.
+{
+ /*
+ * Poison the result: if the very first access faults, the fixup skips
+ * over the loads without writing it. Callers must check trap->scause.
+ */
+ unsigned long val = ~0UL, tmp;
The actual "did a trap happen" contract callers rely on is
trap->scause == 0. If the very first access faults, fixup_exception() will
write scause accordingly to a non-zero value, but nothing in this function
clears trap->scause on the success path.
It is because caller is expected to zero-fill trap as it is happening
now. I will mention that explicitly. I will do the following:
- * @trap: Output pointer to trap details if something went wrong during
read
+ * @trap: Output pointer to trap details if something went wrong during
read.
+ * It must be zero-initialised by the caller: it is written only
when
+ * an access faults, so trap->scause == 0 on return is what
tells the
+ * caller that the read succeeded.
+
+ /*
+ * hlv/hlvx use hstatus.SPVP for the privilege of the access, and the
+ * live vsatp/hgatp for the translation. Xen never installs a value of
+ * its own in hstatus (it is only saved on trap entry and restored
+ * before sret) and it doesn't reschedule before returning to the
+ * guest, so all three still belong to the vCPU which trapped.
+ *
+ * Check the saved copy rather than the live CSR: a nested trap taken
+ * from HS-mode clears hstatus.SPV in the CSR (but leaves SPVP alone).
+ */
+ ASSERT(vcpu_guest_cpu_user_regs(current)->hstatus & HSTATUS_SPV);
Just to understand, what is the aim of this check? Is it to be sure this
function has been called during a guest fault and not a nested HS fault?
Yes.
~ Oleksii
|