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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH for-4.22] dom0less: Prevent division by zero in handle_passthrough_prop()
On 08.07.2026 19:04, Dmytro Prokopchuk1 wrote:
> Hello Jan,
>
> On 7/8/26 09:15, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 07.07.2026 18:08, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>>> On 7/7/26 5:16 PM, Dmytro Prokopchuk1 wrote:
>>>> --- a/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-build.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-build.c
>>>> @@ -154,6 +154,13 @@ static int __init handle_passthrough_prop(struct
>>>> kernel_info *kinfo,
>>>>
>>>> /* xen,reg specifies where to map the MMIO region */
>>>> cell = (const __be32 *)xen_reg->data;
>>>> +
>>>> + if ( (address_cells * 2 + size_cells) == 0 )
>>>
>>> Considering that this calculation happens second time here ...
>>>
>>>> + {
>>>> + printk(XENLOG_ERR "Invalid address/size cells combination (both
>>>> 0)\n");
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> len = fdt32_to_cpu(xen_reg->len) / ((address_cells * 2 +
>>>> size_cells) *
>>>> sizeof(uint32_t));
>>>
>>> ... I think it would be nice to calculate that once.
>>
>> Hmm, originally I meant to simply stay silent here. But now that you say
>> this,
>> I'd like to express that I find this 2nd calculation of the same expression
>> bogus. If the goal is to deal with both values being zero at the same time,
>> check that (and nothing else). If instead the goal is to truly prevent the
>> divisor expression from ending up 0, that (and not a shorter surrogate) would
>> need checking. In particular, the multiplication by sizeof(uint32_t) can
>> convert non-zero to zero.
> Yes, you are right. Need to check whole expression.
>>
>> At that point the question then would be whether overflow (and hence
>> truncation) in any of the involved expressions shouldn't also be detected /
>> rejected.
> Testing zero is useful, but not enough - the expression (address_cells *
> 2 + size_cells) * sizeof(*cell) can overflow and wrap around to a small,
> non-zero number. Source code analyze showed that Xen only supports cell
> sizes of 1 or 2, and there is a ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() in dt_read_number()
> which prevents from using wrong cell values in DEBUG builds.
>
> I would propose the next checking:
>
> if ( address_cells < 1 || address_cells > 2 ||
> size_cells < 1 || size_cells > 2 )
> {
> printk(XENLOG_ERR "Invalid address/size cells combination\n");
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> This will cover zero check, and overflows.
It'll need to be the maintainers of this code to judge whether this is
appropriate here.
Jan
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