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Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.22] x86/cpu-policy: set up host policy earlier
- To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 08:10:45 +0200
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- Cc: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Marek Marczykowski <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@xxxxxxxxxx>, Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Tue, 07 Jul 2026 06:11:08 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On 03.07.2026 08:26, Jan Beulich wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
> @@ -66,8 +66,10 @@ void __init setup_clear_cpu_cap(unsigned
> __clear_bit(cap, boot_cpu_data.x86_capability);
> dfs = x86_cpu_policy_lookup_deep_deps(cap);
>
> - if (!dfs)
> + if (!dfs) {
> + calculate_host_cpu_policy();
> return;
> + }
>
> for (i = 0; i < FSCAPINTS; ++i) {
> cleared_caps[i] |= dfs[i];
> @@ -78,6 +80,8 @@ void __init setup_clear_cpu_cap(unsigned
> __builtin_return_address(0),
> i, forced_caps[i] & dfs[i]);
> }
> +
> + calculate_host_cpu_policy();
> }
>
> void __init setup_force_cpu_cap(unsigned int cap)
> @@ -92,6 +96,8 @@ void __init setup_force_cpu_cap(unsigned
> }
>
> __set_bit(cap, boot_cpu_data.x86_capability);
> +
> + calculate_host_cpu_policy();
> }
During the call yesterday you raised concern over the overhead these calls
may cause. How about we make this call dependent upon cap < FSCAPINTS * 32?
Synthetic features and bug flags don't have dependencies, as they don't
have representation in the policies in the first place.
Whether something similar would make sense in setup_clear_cpu_cap() I'm
inclined to question. We typically "force" synthetic features and bug
flags, while we typically "clear" bits having representation in policy.
Plus if at all such a check would then likely better live ahead of the
call to x86_cpu_policy_lookup_deep_deps() anyway.
Jan
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