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Re: [PATCH v3 5/7] vpci: add SR-IOV support for PVH Dom0


  • To: Volodymyr Babchuk <Volodymyr_Babchuk@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 12 May 2026 08:20:10 +0200
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  • Cc: Mykyta Poturai <Mykyta_Poturai@xxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@xxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 12 May 2026 06:20:33 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 11.05.2026 16:10, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
> Hi Jan,
> 
> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> writes:
> 
>> On 07.05.2026 22:40, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
>>> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> writes:
>>>> On 06.05.2026 11:39, Mykyta Poturai wrote:
>>>>> On 5/4/26 08:37, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> On 23.04.2026 12:12, Mykyta Poturai wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/21/26 17:43, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 09.04.2026 16:01, Mykyta Poturai wrote:
>>>>>>>>> From: Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@xxxxxxx>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This code is expected to only be used by privileged domains,
>>>>>>>>> unprivileged domains should not get access to the SR-IOV capability.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Implement RW handlers for PCI_SRIOV_CTRL register to dynamically
>>>>>>>>> map/unmap VF BARS. Recalculate BAR sizes before mapping VFs to account
>>>>>>>>> for possible changes in the system page size register. Also force VFs 
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> always use emulated reads for command register, this is needed to
>>>>>>>>> prevent some drivers accidentally unmapping BARs.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This apparently refers to the change to vpci_init_header(). Writes are
>>>>>>>> already intercepted. How would a read lead to accidental BAR unmap? 
>>>>>>>> Even
>>>>>>>> for writes I don't see how a VF driver could accidentally unmap BARs, 
>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> the memory decode bit there is hardwired to 0.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Discovery of VFs is
>>>>>>>>> done by Dom0, which must register them with Xen.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If we intercept control register writes, why would we still require
>>>>>>>> Dom0 to report the VFs that appear?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sorry, I don't understand this question. You specifically requested this
>>>>>>> to be done this way in V2. Quoting your reply from V2 below.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>   > Aren't you effectively busy-waiting for these 100ms, by simply
>>>>>>> returning "true"
>>>>>>>   > from vpci_process_pending() until the time has passed? This imo is a
>>>>>>> no-go. You
>>>>>>>   > want to set a timer and put the vCPU to sleep, to wake it up again
>>>>>>> when the
>>>>>>>   > timer has expired. That'll then eliminate the need for the
>>>>>>> not-so-nice patch 4.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>   > Question is whether we need to actually go this far (right away). I
>>>>>>> expect you
>>>>>>>   > don't mean to hand PFs to DomU-s. As long as we keep them in the 
>>>>>>> hardware
>>>>>>>   > domain, can't we trust it to set things up correctly, just like we
>>>>>>> trust it in
>>>>>>>   > a number of other aspects?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How's any of this related to the question I raised here, or your reply
>>>>>> thereto? If we intercept PCI_SRIOV_CTRL, we know when VFs are created.
>>>>>> Why still demand Dom0 to report them then?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The spec states that VFs can take up to 100ms after the VF_ENABLE bit is 
>>>>> set to become alive. We discussed in the V2 that it is not acceptable to 
>>>>> do a required 100ms wait in Xen while blocking a domain. And not doing 
>>>>> that blocking would require some mechanism to only allow a domain to run 
>>>>> for precisely 99(or more?)ms. You yourself suggested that we can trust 
>>>>> the hardware domain with registering VFs if we already trust it with 
>>>>> other PCI-related stuff. Did you change your mind, or am I completely 
>>>>> misunderstanding this question?
>>>>
>>>> No, I still think that we can trust hwdom enough. Nevertheless we should
>>>> aim at being independent of it where possible. And I seem to recall that
>>>> I had also outlined an approach how to avoid spin-waiting for 100ms in
>>>> the hypervisor.
>>>
>>> I want to clarify: you are telling that Xen should not wait for hwdom to
>>> report VFs and instead create them by itself. Is this correct?
>>
>> If that's technically possible, yes.
> 
> Okay, so let's clear this. If I remember correct, you discussed this
> with Mykyta in the previous version and suggested to put the vCPU to
> sleep for 100ms.

I don't think I did (except perhaps from a very abstract perspective),
precisely because of ...

> I don't think that this is a good idea, because guest
> kernel will not be happy about that.

... this. Instead iirc I suggested to refuse (short-circuit) handling
VF register accesses for the next 100ms.

Jan



 


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