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Re: [PATCH v7 14/14] xen/riscv: Disable SSTC extension and add trap-based CSR probing




On 3/10/26 10:15 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 06.03.2026 17:33, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
Some RISC-V platforms expose the SSTC extension, but its CSRs are not
properly saved and restored by Xen. Using SSTC in Xen could therefore
lead to unexpected behaviour.
And what's wrong with (or what gets in the way of) adding proper
saving/restoring? Also, wouldn't a guest use vstimecmp anyway? I.e. what
saving/restoring are you talking about here?

To avoid this in QEMU, disable SSTC by passing "sstc=off". On real
hardware, OpenSBI does not provide a mechanism to disable SSTC via the
DTS (riscv,isa or similar property), as it does not rely on that
property to determine extension availability. Instead, it directly
probes the CSR_STIMECMP register.

Introduce struct trap_info together with the do_expected_trap() handler
to safely probe CSRs. The helper csr_read_allowed() attempts to read a
CSR while catching traps, allowing Xen to detect whether the register
is accessible. This mechanism is used at boot to verify SSTC support and
panic if the CSR is not available.

The trap handling infrastructure may also be reused for other cases
where controlled trap handling is required (e.g. probing instructions
such as HLV*).
Hmm, won't you need a more generic way of dealing with traps anyway? See
Linux'es _ASM_EXTABLE(). See also comments further down.

At the moment this approach works for me and I haven't had a need for more
generic approach. I will look at _ASM_EXTABLE(). I haven't checked yet but
I assume it will require some extra fixup code in trap handler what looks
like over complication for the current case, at least.

--- a/automation/scripts/qemu-smoke-riscv64.sh
+++ b/automation/scripts/qemu-smoke-riscv64.sh
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ rm -f smoke.serial
export TEST_CMD="qemu-system-riscv64 \
      -M virt,aia=aplic-imsic \
-    -cpu rv64,svpbmt=on \
+    -cpu rv64,svpbmt=on,sstc=off \
      -smp 1 \
      -nographic \
      -m 2g \
How does this fit with you panic()ing when SSTC isn't available (i.e. the
register cannot be read)? I must be missing something, likely a result of
me not being able to really understand the description.

When SSTC isn't available my panic() won't occur and then will continue to
be executed. Otherwise, when SSTC is enabled (it is enabled by QEMU by default)
my panic will occur.

--- a/xen/arch/riscv/cpufeature.c
+++ b/xen/arch/riscv/cpufeature.c
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
  #include <xen/sections.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/csr.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
  # error "cpufeature.c functions should be updated to support ACPI"
@@ -483,6 +485,7 @@ void __init riscv_fill_hwcap(void)
      unsigned int i;
      const size_t req_extns_amount = ARRAY_SIZE(required_extensions);
      bool all_extns_available = true;
+    struct trap_info trap;
riscv_fill_hwcap_from_isa_string(); @@ -509,4 +512,9 @@ void __init riscv_fill_hwcap(void)
      if ( !all_extns_available )
          panic("Look why the extensions above are needed in "
                
"https://xenbits.xenproject.org/docs/unstable/misc/riscv/booting.txt\n";);
+
+    csr_read_allowed(CSR_STIMECMP, (unsigned long)&trap);
Please avoid such casts; see also below.

--- a/xen/arch/riscv/entry.S
+++ b/xen/arch/riscv/entry.S
@@ -99,3 +99,27 @@ restore_registers:
sret
  END(handle_trap)
+
+        /*
+         * We assume that the faulting instruction is 4 bytes long and blindly
+         * increment SEPC by 4.
+         *
+         * This should be safe because all places that may trigger this handler
+         * use ".option norvc" around the instruction that could cause the 
trap,
+         * or the instruction is not available in the RVC instruction set.
+         *
+         * do_expected_trap(a3, a4):
+         *   a3 <- pointer to struct trap_info
+         *   a4 <- temporary register
+         */
+FUNC(do_expected_trap)
+        csrr    a4, CSR_SEPC
+        REG_S   a4, RISCV_TRAP_SEPC(a3)
+        csrr    a4, CSR_SCAUSE
+        REG_S   a4, RISCV_TRAP_SCAUSE(a3)
+
+        csrr    a4, CSR_SEPC
Why read sepc a 2nd time?

Because a4 was changed, so it should be re-read, but we can setup CSR_SEPC 
before a4
being changed.


Yet further, what's the point of storing the value
in the first place? The sole present user doesn't care.

I needed that initially for debug. And also it would be useful for trap 
redirection
for example, but it isn't a case now. So for now I can drop that.

--- a/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h
+++ b/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  #include <asm/asm.h>
  #include <xen/const.h>
  #include <asm/riscv_encoding.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ @@ -78,6 +79,37 @@
                             : "memory" );                        \
  })
+/*
+ * Some functions inside asm/system.h requires some of the macros above,
+ * so this header should be included after the macros above are introduced.
+ */
+#include <asm/system.h>
+
+#define csr_read_allowed(csr_num, trap) \
+({ \
+    register unsigned long tinfo asm("a3") = (unsigned long)trap; \
Why can't this variable be of the correct (pointer) type? This would then
at the same time serve as a compile-time check for the caller to have
passed an argument of the correct type.

Good point it could be an option.

+    register unsigned long ttmp asm("a4"); \
+    register unsigned long stvec = (unsigned long)&do_expected_trap; \
Fiddling with stvec may be okay-ish very early during boot. NMIs, for
example, do exist in principle on RISC-V, aiui. There must be a way for them
to be dealt with by other than just M-mode.

Do I understand correct that your concern is about that if NMIs will be handled
in HS-mode that switching stvec in this way could be dangerous as 
do_expected_trap()
doesn't know how to handle NMIs?

If yes, then NMIs should be handled by M-mode as:
  Non-maskable interrupts (NMIs) are only used for hardware error conditions, 
and
  cause an immediate jump to an implementation-defined NMI vector running in 
M-mode
  regardless of the state of a hart’s interrupt enable bits
and:
  The non-maskable interrupt is not made visible via the mip register as its
  presence is implicitly known when executing the NMI trap handler.

So standard delegation registers like mideleg do not apply to NMIs because NMIs
are not visible in the mip register.

I haven't found in OpenSBI how they are explicitly handling NMIs, but it looks
like if they happen in (H)S-mode or (V)U-mode then they will be just redirected
to (H)S-mode or V(U)-mode:
  
https://github.com/riscv-software-src/opensbi/blob/master/lib/sbi/sbi_trap.c#L361
And then do_expected_trap() will fail to handle them...

Interesting that other hypervisors are using the similar approarch (with 
temporary
updating of stvec) and they haven't faced such issue with NMIs yet...


+    register unsigned long ret = 0; \
+    unsigned long flags; \
+    ((struct trap_info *)(trap))->scause = 0; \
"trap" would better be of the correct type. Don't use casts like this, please.

Further, wouldn't you better set the field to a guaranteed invalid value? 0 is
CAUSE_MISALIGNED_FETCH, after all.

I don't see that such an invalid value exist for scause. I think we have to 
reserved
a value from region 24-31 or 48-63 as they are designated for custom use.



+    local_irq_save(flags); \
+    asm volatile ( \
+        ".option push\n" \
+        ".option norvc\n" \
Shouldn't this come later?

Do you mean before where SSTC csr is really tried to be read ("csrr %[ret], 
%[csr]\n")?
Does it really matter in such small inline assembler?


+        "add %[ttmp], %[tinfo], zero\n" \
Why "add", when you really mean "mv"?

I think it could be "mv".

And why set ttmp in the first place, when
that's what do_expected_trap() writes to?

To force the compiler to materialize tinfo in register a4 (ttmp) before the
trap handler runs as handler will use a4 as temporary register.

  Don't you really mean to specify "a4"
as a clobber?

Good point. It makes sense. Likely it can updated to:
  ...
  mv a4, %[tinfo] ... : ... : ... : "memory", "a4"


+        "csrrw %[stvec], " STR(CSR_STVEC) ", %[stvec]\n" \
The assembler does understand "stvec" as an operand, doesn't it?

I haven't tried... I'll check that.


+        "csrr %[ret], %[csr]\n" \
+        "csrw " STR(CSR_STVEC) ", %[stvec]\n" \
+        ".option pop" \
+        : [stvec] "+&r" (stvec), [tinfo] "+&r" (tinfo), \
tinfo isn't modified, is it?

It is modified by handler.


+          [ttmp] "+&r" (ttmp), [ret] "=&r" (ret) \
ttmp isn't initialized (in C), so the compiler could legitimately complain
about the use of an uninitialized variable here (due to the use of + where
= is meant).

ttmp is modified by handler too.


Whereas for ret the situation is the other way around - you initialize the
variable, just to then tell the compiler that it can drop this
initialization, as - supposedly - the asm() always sets it (which it doesn't
when the csrr faults).

It was done in that way as when csrr will lead to a fault, handler will jump
over the csrr instruction and so ret won't be set at all. For that case it was
set to 0.


+        : [csr] "i" (csr_num) \
+        : "memory" ); \
+    local_irq_restore(flags); \
+    ret; \
+})
A macro of this name would better return an indicator of what it is checking,
rather than the CSR value (which the sole user of this macro doesn't even
care about).

With the current one use case it doesn't care but generally I think that someone
will want to use this macro just to get CSR value. I don't have a speicifc 
example
but still it could be used in this way.

Ideally such would also be an inline function.

I thought about that but I had difficulties with csr* instruction and their 
second
operand which expects to have immediate. But if I will have inline function that
csr_num will be in register.

Thanks.

~ Oleksii




 


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