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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 2/4] x86/xstate: Rework XSAVE/XRSTOR given a newer toolchain baseline
On 05/01/2026 3:46 pm, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 30.12.2025 14:54, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
>> @@ -310,21 +310,21 @@ void xsave(struct vcpu *v, uint64_t mask)
>> uint32_t hmask = mask >> 32;
>> uint32_t lmask = mask;
>> unsigned int fip_width = v->domain->arch.x87_fip_width;
>> -#define XSAVE(pfx) \
>> - if ( v->arch.xcr0_accum & XSTATE_XSAVES_ONLY ) \
>> - asm volatile ( ".byte " pfx "0x0f,0xc7,0x2f\n" /* xsaves */ \
>> - : "=m" (*ptr) \
>> - : "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask), "D" (ptr) ); \
>> - else \
>> - alternative_io(".byte " pfx "0x0f,0xae,0x27\n", /* xsave */ \
>> - ".byte " pfx "0x0f,0xae,0x37\n", /* xsaveopt */ \
>> - X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT, \
>> - "=m" (*ptr), \
>> - "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask), "D" (ptr))
>> +
>> +#define XSAVE(pfx) \
>> + if ( v->arch.xcr0_accum & XSTATE_XSAVES_ONLY ) \
>> + asm volatile ( "xsaves %0" \
>> + : "=m" (*ptr) \
>> + : "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask) ); \
>> + else \
>> + alternative_io("xsave %0", \
>> + "xsaveopt %0", X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT, \
>> + "=m" (*ptr), \
>> + "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask))
> While no doubt neater to read this way, there's a subtle latent issue here:
> "m" doesn't exclude RIP-relative addressing, yet that addressing form can't
> be used in replacement code (up and until we leverage your decode-lite to
> actually be able to fix up the displacement).
I guess I'll fix that first.
I'm not interested in trying to keep playing games to work around
deficiencies in our alternatives infrastructure.
> Sadly "o" as a constraint
> doesn't look to be any different in this regard (I think it should be, as
> adding a "small integer" may already bring the displacement beyond the
> permitted range, but their definition of "offsettable" allows this).
>
> This issue is latent until such time that (a) a caller appears passing in
> the address of a Xen-internal variable and (b) we make LTO work again.
> Since the breakage would be impossible to notice at build time, I think we
> would be better off if we avoided it from the beginning. Which may mean
> sacrificing on code gen, by using "r" and then "(%0)" as the insn operand.
Even with LTO, I don't see any plausible case where we have build-time
struct vcpu's to pass in.
>
>> @@ -489,17 +484,17 @@ void xrstor(struct vcpu *v, uint64_t mask)
>> ptr->xsave_hdr.xcomp_bv = 0;
>> }
>> memset(ptr->xsave_hdr.reserved, 0, sizeof(ptr->xsave_hdr.reserved));
>> - continue;
>> + goto retry;
>>
>> case 2: /* Stage 2: Reset all state. */
>> ptr->fpu_sse.mxcsr = MXCSR_DEFAULT;
>> ptr->xsave_hdr.xstate_bv = 0;
>> ptr->xsave_hdr.xcomp_bv = v->arch.xcr0_accum & XSTATE_XSAVES_ONLY
>> ? XSTATE_COMPACTION_ENABLED : 0;
>> - continue;
>> - }
>> + goto retry;
>>
>> - domain_crash(current->domain);
>> + default: /* Stage 3: Nothing else to do. */
>> + domain_crash(v->domain, "Uncorrectable XRSTOR fault\n");
>> return;
> There's an unexplained change here as to which domain is being crashed.
> You switch to crashing the subject domain, yet if that's not also the
> requester, it isn't "guilty" in causing the observed fault.
So dom0 should be crashed because there bad data in the migration stream?
v is always curr. XRSTOR can't be used correctly outside of the subject
context, and indeed the Stage 2 logic above is definitely buggy when v
!= curr.
~Andrew
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