[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 09/22] x86/traps: Move load_system_tables() into traps-setup.c
On 14.08.2025 20:20, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 14/08/2025 8:26 am, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 13.08.2025 13:36, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> On 12/08/2025 10:43 am, Nicola Vetrini wrote: >>>> On 2025-08-08 22:23, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps-setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps-setup.c >>>>> index 8ca379c9e4cb..13b8fcf0ba51 100644 >>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps-setup.c >>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps-setup.c >>>>> @@ -19,6 +20,124 @@ boolean_param("ler", opt_ler); >>>>> >>>>> void nocall entry_PF(void); >>>>> >>>>> +/* >>>>> + * Sets up system tables and descriptors for IDT devliery. >>>>> + * >>>>> + * - Sets up TSS with stack pointers, including ISTs >>>>> + * - Inserts TSS selector into regular and compat GDTs >>>>> + * - Loads GDT, IDT, TR then null LDT >>>>> + * - Sets up IST references in the IDT >>>>> + */ >>>>> +static void load_system_tables(void) >>>>> +{ >>>>> + unsigned int i, cpu = smp_processor_id(); >>>>> + unsigned long stack_bottom = get_stack_bottom(), >>>>> + stack_top = stack_bottom & ~(STACK_SIZE - 1); >>>>> + /* >>>>> + * NB: define tss_page as a local variable because clang 3.5 >>>>> doesn't >>>>> + * support using ARRAY_SIZE against per-cpu variables. >>>>> + */ >>>>> + struct tss_page *tss_page = &this_cpu(tss_page); >>>>> + idt_entry_t *idt = this_cpu(idt); >>>>> + >>>> Given the clang baseline this might not be needed anymore? >>> Hmm. While true, looking at 51461114e26, the code is definitely better >>> written with the tss_page variable and we wouldn't want to go back to >>> the old form. >>> >>> I think that I'll simply drop the comment. >>> >>> ~Andrew >>> >>> P.S. >>> >>> Generally speaking, because of the RELOC_HIDE() in this_cpu(), any time >>> you ever want two accesses to a variable, it's better (code gen wise) to >>> construct a pointer to it and use the point multiple times. >>> >>> I don't understand why there's a RELOC_HIDE() in this_cpu(). The >>> justification doesn't make sense, but I've not had time to explore what >>> happens if we take it out. >> There's no justification in xen/percpu.h? > > Well, it's given in compiler.h by RELOC_HIDE(). > > /* This macro obfuscates arithmetic on a variable address so that gcc > shouldn't recognize the original var, and make assumptions about it */ > > > But this is far from convincing. > >> >> My understanding is that we simply may not expose any accesses to per_cpu_* >> variables directly to the compiler, or there's a risk that it might access >> the "master" variable (i.e. CPU0's on at least x86). > > RELOC_HIDE() doesn't do anything about the correctness of the pointer > arithmetic expression to make the access work. > > I don't see how a correct expression can ever access CPU0's data by > accident. Hmm, upon another look I agree. I wonder whether we inherited this from Linux, where in turn it may have been merely a workaround to deal with preemptible code not correctly accessing per-CPU data (i.e. not accounting for get_per_cpu_offset() not being stable across preemption). Yet then per_cpu() would have been of similar concern when "cpu" isn't properly re-fetched after any possible preemption point ... Jan
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