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Re: [PATCH] x86/domctl: Reject XEN_DOMCTL_hypercall_init against oneself


  • To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 7 Aug 2025 12:54:31 +0200
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@xxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@xxxxxxxxxx>, Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 07 Aug 2025 10:54:50 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 07.08.2025 12:17, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 07/08/2025 10:30 am, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 06.08.2025 18:55, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
>>> @@ -372,6 +372,14 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
>>>          struct page_info *page;
>>>          void *hypercall_page;
>>>  
>>> +        /*
>>> +         * Kernels should use the MSR method to get a hypercall page.  The
>>> +         * toolstack should not be using the DOMCTL on itself.
>>> +         */
>>> +        ret = -EINVAL;
>>> +        if ( d == currd )
>>> +            break;
>> Isn't what the comment says more generally true? To act on themselves, most
>> domctl-s are inappropriate to use, I think. There are a few exceptions, where
>> alternatives simply don't exist (and where, if a kernel wanted to use a 
>> domctl
>> [or sysctl], it would need to go through hoops to deal with the interface
>> versioning). Yet there's still the question of whether we shouldn't apply 
>> this
>> restriction in a broader fashion.
> 
> I'd go so far as to say that domctls ought to be restricted against
> oneself, but it's not quite that easy.  The majority of them already are
> restricted because of domain/vcpu_pause(), but this is all ad-hoc.
> 
> In principle, the control domain ought to be able to issue some of the
> getter's on itself, but even that's inconsistent.  get_dominfo is
> permitted, but paging ops are not.

Hmm, right. And as said, there are a few which simply can't be done a non-
domctl way. For the patch here:
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

> This is still a TBD for the stable tools interfaces.  One option I am
> considering was to split the opcode space by whether it was logically a
> getter or setter, but I expect this does not work nicely if we also want
> to retain backwards compatibility.

I didn't expect we'd strive for (binary) backwards compatibility there.
Source compatibility (i.e. merely requiring a re-compile) may be a goal,
yet even there I wouldn't be certain.

Jan



 


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