|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v13 1/3] xen/domain: unify domain ID allocation
On Tue, Aug 05, 2025 at 03:38:37PM +0200, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 30, 2025 at 05:40:54PM +0000, dmkhn@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
> > From: Denis Mukhin <dmukhin@xxxxxxxx>
> >
> > Currently, there are two different domain ID allocation implementations:
> >
> > 1) Sequential IDs allocation in dom0less Arm code based on max_init_domid;
> >
> > 2) Sequential IDs allocation in XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain; does not use
> > max_init_domid (both Arm and x86).
> >
> > The domain ID allocation covers dom0 or late hwdom, predefined domains,
> > post-boot domains, excluding Xen system domains (domid >=
> > DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED).
> >
> > It makes sense to have a common helper code for such task across
> > architectures
> > (Arm and x86) and between dom0less / toolstack domU allocation.
> >
> > Note, fixing dependency on max_init_domid is out of scope of this patch.
> >
> > Wrap the domain ID allocation as an arch-independent function domid_alloc()
> > in
> > new common/domid.c based on the bitmap.
> >
> > Allocation algorithm:
> > - If an explicit domain ID is provided, verify its availability and use it
> > if
> > ID is not used;
> > - If DOMID_INVALID is provided, search the range
> > [1..DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED-1],
> > starting from the last used ID.
> > Implementation guarantees that two consecutive calls will never return the
> > same ID. ID#0 is reserved for the first boot domain (currently, dom0) and
> > excluded from the allocation range.
> >
> > Remove is_free_domid() helper as it is not needed now.
> >
> > No functional change intended.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Denis Mukhin <dmukhin@xxxxxxxx>
> > Reviewed-by: Alejandro Vallejo <alejandro.garciavallejo@xxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > Changes since v12:
> > - updated comment for domid_alloc() and commit message
> > - added Alejandro's R-b
> > ---
> > xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c | 7 +-
> > xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 7 +-
> > xen/common/Makefile | 1 +
> > xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-build.c | 15 ++--
> > xen/common/domain.c | 2 +
> > xen/common/domctl.c | 42 ++---------
> > xen/common/domid.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > xen/include/xen/domain.h | 3 +
> > 8 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 xen/common/domid.c
> >
> > diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c
> > index 463ae4474d30..789f2b9d3ce7 100644
> > --- a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c
> > @@ -2050,6 +2050,7 @@ void __init create_dom0(void)
> > .grant_opts = XEN_DOMCTL_GRANT_version(opt_gnttab_max_version),
> > };
> > unsigned int flags = CDF_privileged | CDF_hardware;
> > + domid_t domid;
> > int rc;
> >
> > /* The vGIC for DOM0 is exactly emulating the hardware GIC */
> > @@ -2074,7 +2075,11 @@ void __init create_dom0(void)
> > if ( !llc_coloring_enabled )
> > flags |= CDF_directmap;
> >
> > - dom0 = domain_create(0, &dom0_cfg, flags);
> > + domid = domid_alloc(0);
> > + if ( domid == DOMID_INVALID )
> > + panic("Error allocating domain ID 0\n");
> > +
> > + dom0 = domain_create(domid, &dom0_cfg, flags);
> > if ( IS_ERR(dom0) )
> > panic("Error creating domain 0 (rc = %ld)\n", PTR_ERR(dom0));
> >
> > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
> > index 1543dd251cc6..2ff7c28c277b 100644
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
> > @@ -1047,8 +1047,11 @@ static struct domain *__init create_dom0(struct
> > boot_info *bi)
> > if ( iommu_enabled )
> > dom0_cfg.flags |= XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_iommu;
> >
> > - /* Create initial domain. Not d0 for pvshim. */
> > - bd->domid = get_initial_domain_id();
> > + /* Allocate initial domain ID. Not d0 for pvshim. */
> > + bd->domid = domid_alloc(get_initial_domain_id());
> > + if ( bd->domid == DOMID_INVALID )
> > + panic("Error allocating domain ID %d\n", get_initial_domain_id());
>
> Nit: in other error messages in the same function we handle the domid
> as an unsigned integer, so %u probably wants using here. Unless you
> have an explicit intention to print IDs >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED as
> negative integers?
No negative integers, that should be %u
Thanks!
>
> > +
> > d = domain_create(bd->domid, &dom0_cfg,
> > pv_shim ? 0 : CDF_privileged | CDF_hardware);
> > if ( IS_ERR(d) )
> > diff --git a/xen/common/Makefile b/xen/common/Makefile
> > index c316957fcb36..0c7d0f5d46e1 100644
> > --- a/xen/common/Makefile
> > +++ b/xen/common/Makefile
> > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ obj-$(filter-out $(CONFIG_X86),$(CONFIG_ACPI)) += device.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_DEVICE_TREE_PARSE) += device-tree/
> > obj-$(CONFIG_IOREQ_SERVER) += dm.o
> > obj-y += domain.o
> > +obj-y += domid.o
> > obj-y += event_2l.o
> > obj-y += event_channel.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_EVTCHN_FIFO) += event_fifo.o
> > diff --git a/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-build.c
> > b/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-build.c
> > index 6bb038111de9..f4b6b515d2d2 100644
> > --- a/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-build.c
> > +++ b/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-build.c
> > @@ -833,6 +833,7 @@ void __init create_domUs(void)
> > {
> > struct kernel_info ki = KERNEL_INFO_INIT;
> > int rc = parse_dom0less_node(node, &ki.bd);
> > + domid_t domid;
> >
> > if ( rc == -ENOENT )
> > continue;
> > @@ -842,13 +843,13 @@ void __init create_domUs(void)
> > if ( (max_init_domid + 1) >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
> > panic("No more domain IDs available\n");
> >
> > - /*
> > - * The variable max_init_domid is initialized with zero, so here
> > it's
> > - * very important to use the pre-increment operator to call
> > - * domain_create() with a domid > 0. (domid == 0 is reserved for
> > Dom0)
> > - */
> > - ki.bd.d = domain_create(++max_init_domid,
> > - &ki.bd.create_cfg, ki.bd.create_flags);
> > + domid = domid_alloc(DOMID_INVALID);
> > + if ( domid == DOMID_INVALID )
> > + panic("Error allocating ID for domain %s\n",
> > dt_node_name(node));
> > +
> > + max_init_domid = max(max_init_domid, domid);
> > +
> > + ki.bd.d = domain_create(domid, &ki.bd.create_cfg,
> > ki.bd.create_flags);
> > if ( IS_ERR(ki.bd.d) )
> > panic("Error creating domain %s (rc = %ld)\n",
> > dt_node_name(node), PTR_ERR(ki.bd.d));
> > diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
> > index 5241a1629eeb..12fbab01cd8e 100644
> > --- a/xen/common/domain.c
> > +++ b/xen/common/domain.c
> > @@ -1473,6 +1473,8 @@ void domain_destroy(struct domain *d)
> > /* Remove from the domlist/hash. */
> > domlist_remove(d);
> >
> > + domid_free(d->domain_id);
>
> The domlist removal above still allows current users to continue
> "operating" on the domain until the next RCU. Should for safety the
> freeing of the domid be deferred to _domain_destroy(), which is
> executed in RCU context, and thus ensures there are no current users
> of the removed domain?
>
> I cannot think of a specific scenario where this could be dangerous
> right now, but deferring to RCU context together with the final
> cleanup seems safer overall.
I agree, _domain_destroy() is the place for domid_free().
>
> > +
> > /* Schedule RCU asynchronous completion of domain destroy. */
> > call_rcu(&d->rcu, complete_domain_destroy);
> > }
> > diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c
> > index f2a7caaf853c..5509998aa139 100644
> > --- a/xen/common/domctl.c
> > +++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
> > @@ -51,20 +51,6 @@ static int xenctl_bitmap_to_nodemask(nodemask_t
> > *nodemask,
> > MAX_NUMNODES);
> > }
> >
> > -static inline int is_free_domid(domid_t dom)
> > -{
> > - struct domain *d;
> > -
> > - if ( dom >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
> > - return 0;
> > -
> > - if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL )
> > - return 1;
> > -
> > - rcu_unlock_domain(d);
> > - return 0;
> > -}
> > -
> > void getdomaininfo(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info)
> > {
> > struct vcpu *v;
> > @@ -423,36 +409,18 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t)
> > u_domctl)
> >
> > case XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain:
> > {
> > - domid_t dom;
> > - static domid_t rover = 0;
> > + domid_t domid = domid_alloc(op->domain);
> >
> > - dom = op->domain;
> > - if ( (dom > 0) && (dom < DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED) )
> > + if ( domid == DOMID_INVALID )
>
> This is a change in behavior AFAICT, as you now allow
> XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain to possibly create a domain with domid 0 (if
> it's available). Currently op->domain == 0 is handled as op->domain
> == DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED. You either need to adjust the code here, so
> that you do:
>
> domid_t domid = domid_alloc(op->domain ?: DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED);
>
> Or domid_alloc() needs to be adjusted to handle an input domid == 0 as
> it handles DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED.
Thanks!
I will adjust code in do_domctl().
>
> > {
> > ret = -EEXIST;
> > - if ( !is_free_domid(dom) )
> > - break;
> > - }
> > - else
> > - {
> > - for ( dom = rover + 1; dom != rover; dom++ )
> > - {
> > - if ( dom == DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
> > - dom = 1;
> > - if ( is_free_domid(dom) )
> > - break;
> > - }
> > -
> > - ret = -ENOMEM;
> > - if ( dom == rover )
> > - break;
> > -
> > - rover = dom;
> > + break;
> > }
> >
> > - d = domain_create(dom, &op->u.createdomain, false);
> > + d = domain_create(domid, &op->u.createdomain, false);
> > if ( IS_ERR(d) )
> > {
> > + domid_free(domid);
> > ret = PTR_ERR(d);
> > d = NULL;
> > break;
> > diff --git a/xen/common/domid.c b/xen/common/domid.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..e727dcaf0793
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/xen/common/domid.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> > +/*
> > + * Domain ID allocator.
> > + *
> > + * Covers dom0 or late hwdom, predefined domains, post-boot domains.
> > + * Excludes Xen system domains (ID >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED).
> > + *
> > + * Copyright 2025 Ford Motor Company
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <xen/domain.h>
> > +
> > +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(domid_lock);
> > +static DECLARE_BITMAP(domid_bitmap, DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED);
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Allocate domain ID.
> > + *
> > + * @param domid Domain ID hint:
> > + * - If an explicit domain ID is provided, verify its availability and use
> > it
> > + * if ID is not used;
> > + * - If DOMID_INVALID is provided, search [1..DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED-1]
> > range,
> > + * starting from the last used ID. Implementation guarantees that two
> > + * consecutive calls will never return the same ID. ID#0 is reserved for
> > + * the first boot domain (currently, dom0) and excluded from the
> > allocation
> > + * range.
> > + * @return Valid domain ID in case of successful allocation,
> > + * DOMID_INVALID - otherwise.
> > + */
> > +domid_t domid_alloc(domid_t domid)
> > +{
> > + static domid_t domid_last;
> > +
> > + spin_lock(&domid_lock);
> > +
> > + /* Exact match. */
> > + if ( domid < DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
> > + {
> > + if ( __test_and_set_bit(domid, domid_bitmap) )
> > + domid = DOMID_INVALID;
> > + }
> > + /*
> > + * Exhaustive search.
> > + *
> > + * Domain ID#0 is reserved for the first boot domain (e.g. control
> > domain)
> > + * and excluded from allocation.
> > + */
> > + else
> > + {
> > + domid = find_next_zero_bit(domid_bitmap,
> > + DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED,
> > + domid_last + 1);
> > + if ( domid == DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
>
> Nit: you could further gate this second search to domid_last != 0, as
> otherwise the first search has already scanned the whole bitmap.
Ack.
>
> > + domid = find_next_zero_bit(domid_bitmap,
> > + DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED,
> > + 1);
>
> Nit: you could possibly limit this second search to (domid_last + 1)
> size, as you have already searched from [domid_last + 1,
> DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED], and the bitmap couldn't have changed as the
> lock is being held.
Ack.
>
> Thanks, Roger.
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |