[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vpci: add SR-IOV support for PVH Dom0
Le 25/07/2025 à 16:26, Mykyta Poturai a écrit : > From: Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@xxxxxxx> > > This code is expected to only be used by privileged domains, > unprivileged domains should not get access to the SR-IOV capability. > > Implement RW handlers for PCI_SRIOV_CTRL register to dynamically > map/unmap VF BARS. Recalculate BAR sizes before mapping VFs to account > for possible changes in the system page size register. > > Relies on dom0 to enable SR-IOV and PHYSDEVOP to inform Xen about > addition/removal of VFs. > > Signed-off-by: Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@xxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Mykyta Poturai <mykyta_poturai@xxxxxxxx> > --- > CHANGELOG.md | 3 +- > SUPPORT.md | 2 - > xen/drivers/vpci/Makefile | 2 +- > xen/drivers/vpci/header.c | 3 + > xen/drivers/vpci/sriov.c | 235 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c | 1 + > xen/include/xen/vpci.h | 7 +- > 7 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 xen/drivers/vpci/sriov.c > > diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md > index 5f31ca08fe..7b0e8beb76 100644 > --- a/CHANGELOG.md > +++ b/CHANGELOG.md > @@ -23,8 +23,7 @@ The format is based on [Keep a > Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/) > - On x86: > - Option to attempt to fixup p2m page-faults on PVH dom0. > - Resizable BARs is supported for PVH dom0. > - - Support PCI passthrough for HVM domUs when dom0 is PVH (note SR-IOV > - capability usage is not yet supported on PVH dom0). > + - Support PCI passthrough for HVM domUs when dom0 is PVH. > - Smoke tests for the FreeBSD Xen builds in Cirrus CI. > > - On Arm: > diff --git a/SUPPORT.md b/SUPPORT.md > index 6a82a92189..830b598714 100644 > --- a/SUPPORT.md > +++ b/SUPPORT.md > @@ -170,8 +170,6 @@ unexpected behavior or issues on some hardware. > > At least the following features are missing on a PVH dom0: > > - * PCI SR-IOV. > - > * Native NMI forwarding (nmi=dom0 command line option). > > * MCE handling. I would prefer changelog/support changes to be a separate patch or alternatively at the last patch as I don't think SR-IOV is fully working without the 2 remaining ones. > diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/Makefile b/xen/drivers/vpci/Makefile > index a7c8a30a89..fe1e57b64d 100644 > --- a/xen/drivers/vpci/Makefile > +++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/Makefile > @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ > -obj-y += vpci.o header.o rebar.o > +obj-y += vpci.o header.o rebar.o sriov.o > obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_PCI_MSI) += msi.o msix.o > diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c > index f947f652cd..0a840c6dcc 100644 > --- a/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c > +++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c > @@ -839,6 +839,9 @@ static int cf_check init_header(struct pci_dev *pdev) > > ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked(&pdev->domain->pci_lock)); > > + if ( pdev->info.is_virtfn ) > + return 0; > + > switch ( pci_conf_read8(pdev->sbdf, PCI_HEADER_TYPE) & 0x7f ) > { > case PCI_HEADER_TYPE_NORMAL: > diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/sriov.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/sriov.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..640430e3e9 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/sriov.c > @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ > +/* > + * Handlers for accesses to the SR-IOV capability structure. > + * > + * Copyright (C) 2018 Citrix Systems R&D > + */ > + > +#include <xen/sched.h> > +#include <xen/vpci.h> > + > +static int vf_init_bars(const struct pci_dev *vf_pdev) > +{ > + unsigned int i, sriov_pos; > + int vf_idx, rc; > + const struct pci_dev *pf_pdev = vf_pdev->pf_pdev; > + uint16_t offset, stride; > + struct vpci_bar *bars = vf_pdev->vpci->header.bars; > + struct vpci_bar *physfn_vf_bars = pf_pdev->vpci->sriov->vf_bars; > + > + sriov_pos = pci_find_ext_capability(pf_pdev->sbdf, PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_SRIOV); > + offset = pci_conf_read16(pf_pdev->sbdf, sriov_pos + PCI_SRIOV_VF_OFFSET); > + stride = pci_conf_read16(pf_pdev->sbdf, sriov_pos + PCI_SRIOV_VF_STRIDE); > + > + vf_idx = vf_pdev->sbdf.sbdf; > + vf_idx -= pf_pdev->sbdf.sbdf + offset; We can probably rewrite it as vf_idx = vf_pdev->sbdf.sbdf - (pf_pdev->sbdf.sbdf + offset); especially with sbdf being potentially not representable as a int (even though very unlikely). > + if ( vf_idx < 0 ) > + return -EINVAL; > + if ( stride ) > + { > + if ( vf_idx % stride ) > + return -EINVAL; > + vf_idx /= stride; > + } > + > + /* > + * Set up BARs for this VF out of PF's VF BARs taking into account > + * the index of the VF. > + */ > + for ( i = 0; i < PCI_SRIOV_NUM_BARS; i++ ) > + { > + bars[i].addr = physfn_vf_bars[i].addr + vf_idx * > physfn_vf_bars[i].size; > + bars[i].guest_addr = bars[i].addr; > + bars[i].size = physfn_vf_bars[i].size; > + bars[i].type = physfn_vf_bars[i].type; > + bars[i].prefetchable = physfn_vf_bars[i].prefetchable; > + rc = vpci_bar_add_rangeset(vf_pdev, &bars[i], i); > + if ( rc ) > + return rc; > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int map_vf(const struct pci_dev *vf_pdev, uint16_t cmd) > +{ > + int rc; > + > + ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked(&vf_pdev->domain->pci_lock)); > + > + rc = vf_init_bars(vf_pdev); > + if ( rc ) > + return rc; > + > + return vpci_modify_bars(vf_pdev, cmd, false); > +} > + > +static int size_vf_bars(struct pci_dev *pf_pdev, unsigned int sriov_pos) > +{ > + /* > + * NB: a non-const pci_dev of the PF is needed in order to update > + * vf_rlen. > + */ > + struct vpci_bar *bars; > + unsigned int i; > + int rc = 0; > + > + ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked(&pf_pdev->domain->pci_lock)); > + ASSERT(!pf_pdev->info.is_virtfn); > + > + if ( !pf_pdev->vpci->sriov ) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Read BARs for VFs out of PF's SR-IOV extended capability. */ > + bars = pf_pdev->vpci->sriov->vf_bars; > + /* Set the BARs addresses and size. */ > + for ( i = 0; i < PCI_SRIOV_NUM_BARS; i += rc ) > + { > + unsigned int idx = sriov_pos + PCI_SRIOV_BAR + i * 4; > + uint32_t bar; > + uint64_t addr, size; > + > + bar = pci_conf_read32(pf_pdev->sbdf, idx); > + > + rc = pci_size_mem_bar(pf_pdev->sbdf, idx, &addr, &size, > + PCI_BAR_VF | > + ((i == PCI_SRIOV_NUM_BARS - 1) ? PCI_BAR_LAST > + : 0)); > + > + /* > + * Update vf_rlen on the PF. According to the spec the size of > + * the BARs can change if the system page size register is > + * modified, so always update rlen when enabling VFs. > + */ > + pf_pdev->physfn.vf_rlen[i] = size; > + > + if ( !size ) > + { > + bars[i].type = VPCI_BAR_EMPTY; > + continue; > + } > + > + bars[i].addr = addr; > + bars[i].guest_addr = addr; > + bars[i].size = size; > + bars[i].prefetchable = bar & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_PREFETCH; > + > + switch ( rc ) > + { > + case 1: > + bars[i].type = VPCI_BAR_MEM32; > + break; > + > + case 2: > + bars[i].type = VPCI_BAR_MEM64_LO; > + bars[i + 1].type = VPCI_BAR_MEM64_HI; > + break; > + > + default: > + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); > + } > + } > + > + rc = rc > 0 ? 0 : rc; > + > + return rc; > +} > + > +static void cf_check control_write(const struct pci_dev *pdev, unsigned int > reg, > + uint32_t val, void *data) > +{ > + unsigned int sriov_pos = reg - PCI_SRIOV_CTRL; > + uint16_t control = pci_conf_read16(pdev->sbdf, reg); > + bool mem_enabled = control & PCI_SRIOV_CTRL_MSE; > + bool new_mem_enabled = val & PCI_SRIOV_CTRL_MSE; > + > + ASSERT(!pdev->info.is_virtfn); > + > + if ( new_mem_enabled != mem_enabled ) > + { > + struct pci_dev *vf_pdev; > + if ( new_mem_enabled ) > + { > + /* FIXME casting away const-ness to modify vf_rlen */ > + size_vf_bars((struct pci_dev *)pdev, sriov_pos); > + > + list_for_each_entry(vf_pdev, &pdev->vf_list, vf_list) > + map_vf(vf_pdev, PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY); > + } > + else > + { > + list_for_each_entry(vf_pdev, &pdev->vf_list, vf_list) > + map_vf(vf_pdev, 0); > + } > + } > + > + pci_conf_write16(pdev->sbdf, reg, val); > +} > + > +static int vf_init_header(struct pci_dev *vf_pdev) > +{ > + const struct pci_dev *pf_pdev; > + unsigned int sriov_pos; > + int rc = 0; > + uint16_t ctrl; > + > + ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked(&vf_pdev->domain->pci_lock)); > + > + if ( !vf_pdev->info.is_virtfn ) > + return 0; > + > + pf_pdev = vf_pdev->pf_pdev; > + ASSERT(pf_pdev); > + > + sriov_pos = pci_find_ext_capability(pf_pdev->sbdf, PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_SRIOV); > + ctrl = pci_conf_read16(pf_pdev->sbdf, sriov_pos + PCI_SRIOV_CTRL); > + > + if ( (pf_pdev->domain == vf_pdev->domain) && (ctrl & PCI_SRIOV_CTRL_MSE) > ) > + { > + rc = map_vf(vf_pdev, PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY); > + if ( rc ) > + return rc; > + } > + > + return rc; > +} > + > +static int init_sriov(struct pci_dev *pdev) > +{ > + unsigned int pos; > + > + if ( pdev->info.is_virtfn ) > + return vf_init_header(pdev); > + > + pos = pci_find_ext_capability(pdev->sbdf, PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_SRIOV); > + > + if ( !pos ) > + return 0; > + > + if ( !is_hardware_domain(pdev->domain) ) > + { > + printk(XENLOG_ERR > + "%pp: SR-IOV configuration unsupported for unpriv %pd\n", > + &pdev->sbdf, pdev->domain); > + return 0; > + } Should it instead rely on xsm to know if it the operation is allowed or not for this domain ? > + > + pdev->vpci->sriov = xzalloc(struct vpci_sriov); > + if ( !pdev->vpci->sriov ) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + return vpci_add_register(pdev->vpci, vpci_hw_read16, control_write, > + pos + PCI_SRIOV_CTRL, 2, NULL); > +} > + > +REGISTER_VPCI_INIT(init_sriov, VPCI_PRIORITY_LOW); > + > +/* > + * Local variables: > + * mode: C > + * c-file-style: "BSD" > + * c-basic-offset: 4 > + * tab-width: 4 > + * indent-tabs-mode: nil > + * End: > + */ > diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c > index 09988f04c2..7af6651831 100644 > --- a/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c > +++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c > @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ void vpci_deassign_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) > for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pdev->vpci->header.bars); i++ ) > rangeset_destroy(pdev->vpci->header.bars[i].mem); > > + xfree(pdev->vpci->sriov); > xfree(pdev->vpci->msix); > xfree(pdev->vpci->msi); > xfree(pdev->vpci); > diff --git a/xen/include/xen/vpci.h b/xen/include/xen/vpci.h > index 06f7039f20..9e8dcab17e 100644 > --- a/xen/include/xen/vpci.h > +++ b/xen/include/xen/vpci.h > @@ -138,7 +138,6 @@ struct vpci { > * upon to know whether BARs are mapped into the guest p2m. > */ > bool bars_mapped : 1; > - /* FIXME: currently there's no support for SR-IOV. */ > } header; > > /* MSI data. */ > @@ -192,6 +191,12 @@ struct vpci { > struct vpci_arch_msix_entry arch; > } entries[]; > } *msix; > + > + struct vpci_sriov { > + /* PF only */ > + struct vpci_bar vf_bars[PCI_SRIOV_NUM_BARS]; > + } *sriov; > + > #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_VPCI_GUEST_SUPPORT > /* Guest SBDF of the device. */ > #define INVALID_GUEST_SBDF ((pci_sbdf_t){ .sbdf = ~0U }) Teddy Astie | Vates XCP-ng Developer XCP-ng & Xen Orchestra - Vates solutions web: https://vates.tech
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