Re: [PATCH v4] Avoid crash calling PrintErrMesg from efi_multiboot2

[Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@xxxxxxxxx>]

On Tue, Nov 5, 2024 at 2:52 PM Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 19.08.2024 16:29, Frediano Ziglio wrote:
> > --- a/xen/common/efi/boot.c
> > +++ b/xen/common/efi/boot.c
> > @@ -287,19 +287,36 @@ static bool __init match_guid(const EFI_GUID *guid1, 
> > const EFI_GUID *guid2)
> >  /* generic routine for printing error messages */
> >  static void __init PrintErrMesg(const CHAR16 *mesg, EFI_STATUS ErrCode)
> >  {
> > -    static const CHAR16* const ErrCodeToStr[] __initconstrel = {
> > -        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & EFI_NOT_FOUND]           = L"Not found",
> > -        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & EFI_NO_MEDIA]            = L"The device has no 
> > media",
> > -        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED]       = L"Media changed",
> > -        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & EFI_DEVICE_ERROR]        = L"Device error",
> > -        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & EFI_VOLUME_CORRUPTED]    = L"Volume corrupted",
> > -        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & EFI_ACCESS_DENIED]       = L"Access denied",
> > -        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES]    = L"Out of resources",
> > -        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & EFI_VOLUME_FULL]         = L"Volume is full",
> > -        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION]  = L"Security 
> > violation",
> > -        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & EFI_CRC_ERROR]           = L"CRC error",
> > -        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & EFI_COMPROMISED_DATA]    = L"Compromised data",
> > -        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL]    = L"Buffer too small",
> > +#define ERROR_MESSAGE_LIST \
> > +    ERROR_MESSAGE(EFI_NOT_FOUND, "Not found") \
> > +    ERROR_MESSAGE(EFI_NO_MEDIA, "The device has no media") \
> > +    ERROR_MESSAGE(EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED, "Media changed") \
> > +    ERROR_MESSAGE(EFI_DEVICE_ERROR, "Device error") \
> > +    ERROR_MESSAGE(EFI_VOLUME_CORRUPTED, "Volume corrupted") \
> > +    ERROR_MESSAGE(EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, "Access denied") \
> > +    ERROR_MESSAGE(EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES, "Out of resources") \
> > +    ERROR_MESSAGE(EFI_VOLUME_FULL, "Volume is full") \
> > +    ERROR_MESSAGE(EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, "Security violation") \
> > +    ERROR_MESSAGE(EFI_CRC_ERROR, "CRC error") \
> > +    ERROR_MESSAGE(EFI_COMPROMISED_DATA, "Compromised data") \
> > +    ERROR_MESSAGE(EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, "Buffer too small")
> > +
> > +    static const struct ErrorStrings {
> > +        CHAR16 start;
> > +#undef ERROR_MESSAGE
> > +#define ERROR_MESSAGE(code, str) CHAR16 msg_ ## code[sizeof(str)];
> > +        ERROR_MESSAGE_LIST
> > +    } ErrorStrings __initconst = {
> > +        0
> > +#undef ERROR_MESSAGE
> > +#define ERROR_MESSAGE(code, str) , L ## str
> > +        ERROR_MESSAGE_LIST
> > +    };
> > +    static const uint16_t ErrCodeToStr[] __initconst = {
> > +#undef ERROR_MESSAGE
> > +#define ERROR_MESSAGE(code, str) \
> > +        [~EFI_ERROR_MASK & code] = offsetof(struct ErrorStrings, msg_ ## 
> > code),
> > +        ERROR_MESSAGE_LIST
> >      };
> >      EFI_STATUS ErrIdx = ErrCode & ~EFI_ERROR_MASK;
> >
>
> A while ago Andrew and I discussed this, and I was apparently wrongly 
> expecting
> him to come back here, as (iirc; no record of this that I could find in the 
> mail
> archives, so I'm sorry if my recollection is wrong) he was the one to object. 
> We
> concluded that it wants at least considering to undo the respective part of
> 00d5d5ce23e6, finding a different solution to the Clang issue there.
>
> Jan

I thought this patch was already applied.
I didn't remember any clang issue.
As far as I know, this was delayed by an issue that turned out to be different.
So, any reason why not to merge the original patch?

Frediano