Re: [PATCH v3] x86/dom0: delay setting SMAP after dom0 build is done

[Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, Aug 01, 2024 at 12:28:06PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 01.08.2024 11:52, Roger Pau Monne wrote:
> > @@ -1907,16 +1890,25 @@ void asmlinkage __init noreturn 
> > __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
> >      if ( cpu_has_smep && opt_smep != SMEP_HVM_ONLY )
> >          setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMEP);
> >      if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMEP) )
> > +    {
> >          set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMEP);
> > +        cr4_pv32_mask = mmu_cr4_features & XEN_CR4_PV32_BITS;
> 
> Could be just "cr4_pv32_mask = X86_CR4_SMEP" now?

Yes, indeed, same below then.

> > +    }
> >  
> >      if ( !opt_smap )
> >          setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
> >      if ( cpu_has_smap && opt_smap != SMAP_HVM_ONLY )
> >          setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMAP);
> >      if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMAP) )
> > -        set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMAP);
> > -
> > -    cr4_pv32_mask = mmu_cr4_features & XEN_CR4_PV32_BITS;
> > +        /*
> > +         * Set SMAP on the %cr4 mask so that it's set for APs on bringup, 
> > but
> > +         * don't set for the BSP until domain building is done.
> > +         *
> > +         * Don't set it in cr4_pv32_mask either, until it's also set on the
> > +         * BSP.  Otherwise the BUG in cr4_pv32_restore would trigger for 
> > events
> > +         * received on the BSP.
> > +         */
> > +        mmu_cr4_features |= X86_CR4_SMAP;
> 
> Don't you put APs at risk this way of triggering the BUG in 
> cr4_pv32_restore()?
> They'll have the bit set in %cr4, but the bit remains clear in cr4_pv32_mask
> until much later.

As long as the bit is set in %cr4, but not in cr4_pv32_mask the BUG in
cr4_pv32_restore won't hit.

> > @@ -2048,6 +2040,18 @@ void asmlinkage __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned 
> > long mbi_p)
> >      if ( !dom0 )
> >          panic("Could not set up DOM0 guest OS\n");
> >  
> > +    /*
> > +     * Enable SMAP only after being done with the domain building phase, 
> > as the
> > +     * PV builder switches to the domain page-tables and must be run with 
> > SMAP
> > +     * disabled.
> > +     */
> > +    if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMAP) )
> > +    {
> > +        ASSERT(mmu_cr4_features & X86_CR4_SMAP);
> > +        write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_SMAP);
> > +        cr4_pv32_mask = mmu_cr4_features & XEN_CR4_PV32_BITS;
> > +    }
> 
> Similarly for the BSP here: If we take an NMI between setting CR4.SMAP and
> setting the bit in cr4_pv32_mask, cr4_pv32_restore() would hit the BUG
> there if I'm not mistaken.

No, having extra bits set in %cr4 not present in cr4_pv32_mask won't
trigger the BUG.  It's the other way around, having bits set in
cr4_pv32_mask but not in %cr4.  As long as %cr4 is always updated
ahead of setting the bit in cr4_pv32_mask that's fine.

See the logic in cr4_pv32_restore:

        /* Check that _all_ of the bits intended to be set actually are. */
        mov   %cr4, %rax
        and   cr4_pv32_mask(%rip), %rax
        cmp   cr4_pv32_mask(%rip), %rax
        je    1j
        [...]
        BUG

Otherwise none of this would be safe, as it's impossible to set %cr4
and cr4_pv32_mask atomically in a single instruction.

> I further fear that switching things around won't
> help either. The code you remove from create_dom0() looks to have the same
> issue. The only NMI-safe sequence looks to be: Clear both bits from %cr4,
> update cr4_pv32_mask as wanted, and then write %cr4 with the bits from
> cr4_pv32_mask ORed in.

No, that won't be safe, as cr4_pv32_mask would contain bits not set in
%cr4 and cr4_pv32_restore would hit the BUG.  The update order is the
%other way around, first set in %cr4, then in cr4_pv32_mask.

Thanks, Roger.