[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH RFC 07/10] domain: map/unmap GADDR based shared guest areas
On 20.01.2023 19:15, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 18/01/2023 9:55 am, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 17.01.2023 23:04, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> On 19/10/2022 8:43 am, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> Noteworthy differences from map_vcpu_info(): >>>> - areas can be registered more than once (and de-registered), >>> When register by GFN is available, there is never a good reason to the >>> same area twice. >> Why not? Why shouldn't different entities be permitted to register their >> areas, one after the other? This at the very least requires a way to >> de-register. > > Because it's useless and extra complexity. From the point of view of > any guest, its an MMIO(ish) window that Xen happens to update the > content of. > > You don't get systems where you can ask hardware for e.g. "another copy > of the HPET at mfn $foo please". I/O ports appear in multiple places on many systems. I think MMIO regions can, too. And then I don't see why there couldn't be a way to actually control this (via e.g. some chipset specific register). >>>> RFC: By using global domain page mappings the demand on the underlying >>>> VA range may increase significantly. I did consider to use per- >>>> domain mappings instead, but they exist for x86 only. Of course we >>>> could have arch_{,un}map_guest_area() aliasing global domain page >>>> mapping functions on Arm and using per-domain mappings on x86. Yet >>>> then again map_vcpu_info() doesn't do so either (albeit that's >>>> likely to be converted subsequently to use map_vcpu_area() anyway). >>> ... this by providing a bound on the amount of vmap() space can be consumed. >> I'm afraid I don't understand. When re-registering a different area, the >> earlier one will be unmapped. The consumption of vmap space cannot grow >> (or else we'd have a resource leak and hence an XSA). > > In which case you mean "can be re-registered elsewhere". More > specifically, the area can be moved, and isn't a singleton operation > like map_vcpu_info was. > > The wording as presented firmly suggests the presence of an XSA. You mean the "map_vcpu_info() doesn't do so either"? That talks about the function not using per-domain mappings. There's no connection at all that I can see to a missed unmapping, which at this point is the only thing I can deduce you might be referring to. >>>> RFC: In map_guest_area() I'm not checking the P2M type, instead - just >>>> like map_vcpu_info() - solely relying on the type ref acquisition. >>>> Checking for p2m_ram_rw alone would be wrong, as at least >>>> p2m_ram_logdirty ought to also be okay to use here (and in similar >>>> cases, e.g. in Argo's find_ring_mfn()). p2m_is_pageable() could be >>>> used here (like altp2m_vcpu_enable_ve() does) as well as in >>>> map_vcpu_info(), yet then again the P2M type is stale by the time >>>> it is being looked at anyway without the P2M lock held. >>> Again, another error caused by Xen not knowing the guest physical >>> address layout. These mappings should be restricted to just RAM regions >>> and I think we want to enforce that right from the outset. >> Meaning what exactly in terms of action for me to take? As said, checking >> the P2M type is pointless. So without you being more explicit, all I can >> take your reply for is merely a comment, with no action on my part (not >> even to remove this RFC remark). > > There will become a point where it will need to become prohibited to > issue this against something which isn't p2m_type_ram. If we had a sane > idea of the guest physmap, I'd go as far as saying E820_RAM, but that's > clearly not feasible yet. > > Even now, absolutely nothing good can possibly come of e.g. trying to > overlay it on the grant table, or a grant mapping. > > ram || logdirty ought to exclude most cases we care about the guest > (not) putting the mapping. It's still not clear to me what you want me to do: If I add the P2M type check here including log-dirty, then this will be inconsistent with what we do elsewhere _and_ useless code (for the time being). I hope you're not making a scope-creeping request for me to "fix" all the other places (I may not have found all) where such a P2M type check is either missing of failing to include log-dirty. Jan
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