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Re: [PATCH] xen: Allow platform PCI interrupt to be shared
- To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Paul Durrant <paul@xxxxxxx>
- From: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 13:53:28 +0000
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- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
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- Thread-topic: [PATCH] xen: Allow platform PCI interrupt to be shared
On 18/01/2023 12:22 pm, David Woodhouse wrote:
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> What does xen_evtchn_do_upcall() exist for? Can we delete it? I don't
> see it being called anywhere.
Seems the caller was dropped by
cb09ea2924cbf1a42da59bd30a59cc1836240bcb, but the CONFIG_PVHVM looks
bogus because the precondition to setting it up was being in a Xen HVM
guest, and the guest is taking evtchns by vector either way.
PV guests use the entrypoint called exc_xen_hypervisor_callback which
really ought to gain a PV in its name somewhere. Also the comments look
distinctly suspect.
Some tidying in this area would be valuable.
~Andrew
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