[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH v2 3/5] xen/version: Introduce non-truncating XENVER_* subops
Recently in XenServer, we have encountered problems caused by both XENVER_extraversion and XENVER_commandline having fixed bounds. More than just the invariant size, the APIs/ABIs also broken by typedef-ing an array, and using an unqualified 'char' which has implementation-specific signed-ness Provide brand new ops, which are capable of expressing variable length strings, and mark the older ops as broken. This fixes all issues around XENVER_extraversion being longer than 15 chars. More work is required to remove other assumptions about XENVER_commandline being 1023 chars long. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> --- CC: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx> CC: Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx> CC: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> CC: Daniel Smith <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> CC: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@xxxxxxxxx> v2: * Remove xen_capabilities_info_t from the stack now that arch_get_xen_caps() has gone. * Use an arbitrary limit check much lower than INT_MAX. * Use "buf" rather than "string" terminology. * Expand the API comment. Tested by forcing XENVER_extraversion to be 20 chars long, and confirming that an untruncated version can be obtained. --- xen/common/kernel.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/include/public/version.h | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- xen/include/xlat.lst | 1 + xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 4 +++ 4 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/common/kernel.c b/xen/common/kernel.c index 4fa1d6710115..cc5d8247b04d 100644 --- a/xen/common/kernel.c +++ b/xen/common/kernel.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ CHECK_build_id; CHECK_compile_info; CHECK_feature_info; +CHECK_varbuf; #endif enum system_state system_state = SYS_STATE_early_boot; @@ -470,6 +471,59 @@ static int __init cf_check param_init(void) __initcall(param_init); #endif +static long xenver_varbuf_op(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) +{ + struct xen_varbuf user_str; + const char *str = NULL; + size_t sz; + + switch ( cmd ) + { + case XENVER_extraversion2: + str = xen_extra_version(); + break; + + case XENVER_changeset2: + str = xen_changeset(); + break; + + case XENVER_commandline2: + str = saved_cmdline; + break; + + case XENVER_capabilities2: + str = xen_cap_info; + break; + + default: + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); + return -ENODATA; + } + + sz = strlen(str); + + if ( sz > KB(64) ) /* Arbitrary limit. Avoid long-running operations. */ + return -E2BIG; + + if ( guest_handle_is_null(arg) ) /* Length request */ + return sz; + + if ( copy_from_guest(&user_str, arg, 1) ) + return -EFAULT; + + if ( user_str.len == 0 ) + return -EINVAL; + + if ( sz > user_str.len ) + return -ENOBUFS; + + if ( copy_to_guest_offset(arg, offsetof(struct xen_varbuf, buf), + str, sz) ) + return -EFAULT; + + return sz; +} + long do_xen_version(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) { bool_t deny = !!xsm_xen_version(XSM_OTHER, cmd); @@ -683,6 +737,14 @@ long do_xen_version(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) return sz; } + + case XENVER_extraversion2: + case XENVER_capabilities2: + case XENVER_changeset2: + case XENVER_commandline2: + if ( deny ) + return -EPERM; + return xenver_varbuf_op(cmd, arg); } return -ENOSYS; diff --git a/xen/include/public/version.h b/xen/include/public/version.h index cbc4ef7a46e6..9287b5d3ff50 100644 --- a/xen/include/public/version.h +++ b/xen/include/public/version.h @@ -19,12 +19,20 @@ /* arg == NULL; returns major:minor (16:16). */ #define XENVER_version 0 -/* arg == xen_extraversion_t. */ +/* + * arg == xen_extraversion_t. + * + * This API/ABI is broken. Use XENVER_extraversion2 instead. + */ #define XENVER_extraversion 1 typedef char xen_extraversion_t[16]; #define XEN_EXTRAVERSION_LEN (sizeof(xen_extraversion_t)) -/* arg == xen_compile_info_t. */ +/* + * arg == xen_compile_info_t. + * + * This API/ABI is broken and truncates data. + */ #define XENVER_compile_info 2 struct xen_compile_info { char compiler[64]; @@ -34,10 +42,20 @@ struct xen_compile_info { }; typedef struct xen_compile_info xen_compile_info_t; +/* + * arg == xen_capabilities_info_t. + * + * This API/ABI is broken. Use XENVER_capabilities2 instead. + */ #define XENVER_capabilities 3 typedef char xen_capabilities_info_t[1024]; #define XEN_CAPABILITIES_INFO_LEN (sizeof(xen_capabilities_info_t)) +/* + * arg == xen_changeset_info_t. + * + * This API/ABI is broken. Use XENVER_changeset2 instead. + */ #define XENVER_changeset 4 typedef char xen_changeset_info_t[64]; #define XEN_CHANGESET_INFO_LEN (sizeof(xen_changeset_info_t)) @@ -95,6 +113,11 @@ typedef struct xen_feature_info xen_feature_info_t; */ #define XENVER_guest_handle 8 +/* + * arg == xen_commandline_t. + * + * This API/ABI is broken. Use XENVER_commandline2 instead. + */ #define XENVER_commandline 9 typedef char xen_commandline_t[1024]; @@ -110,6 +133,42 @@ struct xen_build_id { }; typedef struct xen_build_id xen_build_id_t; +/* + * Container for an arbitrary variable length buffer. + */ +struct xen_varbuf { + uint32_t len; /* IN: size of buf[] in bytes. */ + unsigned char buf[XEN_FLEX_ARRAY_DIM]; /* OUT: requested data. */ +}; +typedef struct xen_varbuf xen_varbuf_t; + +/* + * arg == xen_varbuf_t + * + * Equivalent to the original ops, but with a non-truncating API/ABI. + * + * These hypercalls can fail for a number of reasons. All callers must handle + * -XEN_xxx return values appropriately. + * + * Passing arg == NULL is a request for size, which will be signalled with a + * non-negative return value. Note: a return size of 0 may be legitimate for + * the requested subop. + * + * Otherwise, the input xen_varbuf_t provides the size of the following + * buffer. Xen will fill the buffer, and return the number of bytes written + * (e.g. if the input buffer was longer than necessary). + * + * Some subops may return binary data. Some subops may be expected to return + * textural data. These are returned without a NUL terminator, and while the + * contents is expected to be ASCII/UTF-8, Xen makes no guarentees to this + * effect. e.g. Xen has no control over the formatting used for the command + * line. + */ +#define XENVER_extraversion2 11 +#define XENVER_capabilities2 12 +#define XENVER_changeset2 13 +#define XENVER_commandline2 14 + #endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_VERSION_H__ */ /* diff --git a/xen/include/xlat.lst b/xen/include/xlat.lst index d601a8a98421..762c8a77fb27 100644 --- a/xen/include/xlat.lst +++ b/xen/include/xlat.lst @@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ ? build_id version.h ? compile_info version.h ? feature_info version.h +? varbuf version.h ? xenoprof_init xenoprof.h ? xenoprof_passive xenoprof.h ? flask_access xsm/flask_op.h diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c index 78225f68c15c..a671dcd0322e 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c @@ -1777,15 +1777,18 @@ static int cf_check flask_xen_version(uint32_t op) /* These sub-ops ignore the permission checks and return data. */ return 0; case XENVER_extraversion: + case XENVER_extraversion2: return avc_has_perm(dsid, SECINITSID_XEN, SECCLASS_VERSION, VERSION__XEN_EXTRAVERSION, NULL); case XENVER_compile_info: return avc_has_perm(dsid, SECINITSID_XEN, SECCLASS_VERSION, VERSION__XEN_COMPILE_INFO, NULL); case XENVER_capabilities: + case XENVER_capabilities2: return avc_has_perm(dsid, SECINITSID_XEN, SECCLASS_VERSION, VERSION__XEN_CAPABILITIES, NULL); case XENVER_changeset: + case XENVER_changeset2: return avc_has_perm(dsid, SECINITSID_XEN, SECCLASS_VERSION, VERSION__XEN_CHANGESET, NULL); case XENVER_pagesize: @@ -1795,6 +1798,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_xen_version(uint32_t op) return avc_has_perm(dsid, SECINITSID_XEN, SECCLASS_VERSION, VERSION__XEN_GUEST_HANDLE, NULL); case XENVER_commandline: + case XENVER_commandline2: return avc_has_perm(dsid, SECINITSID_XEN, SECCLASS_VERSION, VERSION__XEN_COMMANDLINE, NULL); case XENVER_build_id: -- 2.11.0
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