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[PATCH v2 3/5] xen/version: Introduce non-truncating XENVER_* subops


  • To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 23:08:33 +0000
  • Authentication-results: esa2.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; dkim=none (message not signed) header.i=none
  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>, "Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Daniel Smith <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 23:08:50 +0000
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  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

Recently in XenServer, we have encountered problems caused by both
XENVER_extraversion and XENVER_commandline having fixed bounds.

More than just the invariant size, the APIs/ABIs also broken by typedef-ing an
array, and using an unqualified 'char' which has implementation-specific
signed-ness

Provide brand new ops, which are capable of expressing variable length
strings, and mark the older ops as broken.

This fixes all issues around XENVER_extraversion being longer than 15 chars.
More work is required to remove other assumptions about XENVER_commandline
being 1023 chars long.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
CC: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>
CC: Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>
CC: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Daniel Smith <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@xxxxxxxxx>

v2:
 * Remove xen_capabilities_info_t from the stack now that arch_get_xen_caps()
   has gone.
 * Use an arbitrary limit check much lower than INT_MAX.
 * Use "buf" rather than "string" terminology.
 * Expand the API comment.

Tested by forcing XENVER_extraversion to be 20 chars long, and confirming that
an untruncated version can be obtained.
---
 xen/common/kernel.c          | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 xen/include/public/version.h | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 xen/include/xlat.lst         |  1 +
 xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c        |  4 +++
 4 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/common/kernel.c b/xen/common/kernel.c
index 4fa1d6710115..cc5d8247b04d 100644
--- a/xen/common/kernel.c
+++ b/xen/common/kernel.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 CHECK_build_id;
 CHECK_compile_info;
 CHECK_feature_info;
+CHECK_varbuf;
 #endif
 
 enum system_state system_state = SYS_STATE_early_boot;
@@ -470,6 +471,59 @@ static int __init cf_check param_init(void)
 __initcall(param_init);
 #endif
 
+static long xenver_varbuf_op(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
+{
+    struct xen_varbuf user_str;
+    const char *str = NULL;
+    size_t sz;
+
+    switch ( cmd )
+    {
+    case XENVER_extraversion2:
+        str = xen_extra_version();
+        break;
+
+    case XENVER_changeset2:
+        str = xen_changeset();
+        break;
+
+    case XENVER_commandline2:
+        str = saved_cmdline;
+        break;
+
+    case XENVER_capabilities2:
+        str = xen_cap_info;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        return -ENODATA;
+    }
+
+    sz = strlen(str);
+
+    if ( sz > KB(64) ) /* Arbitrary limit.  Avoid long-running operations. */
+        return -E2BIG;
+
+    if ( guest_handle_is_null(arg) ) /* Length request */
+        return sz;
+
+    if ( copy_from_guest(&user_str, arg, 1) )
+        return -EFAULT;
+
+    if ( user_str.len == 0 )
+        return -EINVAL;
+
+    if ( sz > user_str.len )
+        return -ENOBUFS;
+
+    if ( copy_to_guest_offset(arg, offsetof(struct xen_varbuf, buf),
+                              str, sz) )
+        return -EFAULT;
+
+    return sz;
+}
+
 long do_xen_version(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
 {
     bool_t deny = !!xsm_xen_version(XSM_OTHER, cmd);
@@ -683,6 +737,14 @@ long do_xen_version(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) 
arg)
 
         return sz;
     }
+
+    case XENVER_extraversion2:
+    case XENVER_capabilities2:
+    case XENVER_changeset2:
+    case XENVER_commandline2:
+        if ( deny )
+            return -EPERM;
+        return xenver_varbuf_op(cmd, arg);
     }
 
     return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/version.h b/xen/include/public/version.h
index cbc4ef7a46e6..9287b5d3ff50 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/version.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/version.h
@@ -19,12 +19,20 @@
 /* arg == NULL; returns major:minor (16:16). */
 #define XENVER_version      0
 
-/* arg == xen_extraversion_t. */
+/*
+ * arg == xen_extraversion_t.
+ *
+ * This API/ABI is broken.  Use XENVER_extraversion2 instead.
+ */
 #define XENVER_extraversion 1
 typedef char xen_extraversion_t[16];
 #define XEN_EXTRAVERSION_LEN (sizeof(xen_extraversion_t))
 
-/* arg == xen_compile_info_t. */
+/*
+ * arg == xen_compile_info_t.
+ *
+ * This API/ABI is broken and truncates data.
+ */
 #define XENVER_compile_info 2
 struct xen_compile_info {
     char compiler[64];
@@ -34,10 +42,20 @@ struct xen_compile_info {
 };
 typedef struct xen_compile_info xen_compile_info_t;
 
+/*
+ * arg == xen_capabilities_info_t.
+ *
+ * This API/ABI is broken.  Use XENVER_capabilities2 instead.
+ */
 #define XENVER_capabilities 3
 typedef char xen_capabilities_info_t[1024];
 #define XEN_CAPABILITIES_INFO_LEN (sizeof(xen_capabilities_info_t))
 
+/*
+ * arg == xen_changeset_info_t.
+ *
+ * This API/ABI is broken.  Use XENVER_changeset2 instead.
+ */
 #define XENVER_changeset 4
 typedef char xen_changeset_info_t[64];
 #define XEN_CHANGESET_INFO_LEN (sizeof(xen_changeset_info_t))
@@ -95,6 +113,11 @@ typedef struct xen_feature_info xen_feature_info_t;
  */
 #define XENVER_guest_handle 8
 
+/*
+ * arg == xen_commandline_t.
+ *
+ * This API/ABI is broken.  Use XENVER_commandline2 instead.
+ */
 #define XENVER_commandline 9
 typedef char xen_commandline_t[1024];
 
@@ -110,6 +133,42 @@ struct xen_build_id {
 };
 typedef struct xen_build_id xen_build_id_t;
 
+/*
+ * Container for an arbitrary variable length buffer.
+ */
+struct xen_varbuf {
+    uint32_t len;                          /* IN:  size of buf[] in bytes. */
+    unsigned char buf[XEN_FLEX_ARRAY_DIM]; /* OUT: requested data.         */
+};
+typedef struct xen_varbuf xen_varbuf_t;
+
+/*
+ * arg == xen_varbuf_t
+ *
+ * Equivalent to the original ops, but with a non-truncating API/ABI.
+ *
+ * These hypercalls can fail for a number of reasons.  All callers must handle
+ * -XEN_xxx return values appropriately.
+ *
+ * Passing arg == NULL is a request for size, which will be signalled with a
+ * non-negative return value.  Note: a return size of 0 may be legitimate for
+ * the requested subop.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, the input xen_varbuf_t provides the size of the following
+ * buffer.  Xen will fill the buffer, and return the number of bytes written
+ * (e.g. if the input buffer was longer than necessary).
+ *
+ * Some subops may return binary data.  Some subops may be expected to return
+ * textural data.  These are returned without a NUL terminator, and while the
+ * contents is expected to be ASCII/UTF-8, Xen makes no guarentees to this
+ * effect.  e.g. Xen has no control over the formatting used for the command
+ * line.
+ */
+#define XENVER_extraversion2 11
+#define XENVER_capabilities2 12
+#define XENVER_changeset2    13
+#define XENVER_commandline2  14
+
 #endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_VERSION_H__ */
 
 /*
diff --git a/xen/include/xlat.lst b/xen/include/xlat.lst
index d601a8a98421..762c8a77fb27 100644
--- a/xen/include/xlat.lst
+++ b/xen/include/xlat.lst
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@
 ?      build_id                        version.h
 ?      compile_info                    version.h
 ?      feature_info                    version.h
+?      varbuf                          version.h
 ?      xenoprof_init                   xenoprof.h
 ?      xenoprof_passive                xenoprof.h
 ?      flask_access                    xsm/flask_op.h
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 78225f68c15c..a671dcd0322e 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -1777,15 +1777,18 @@ static int cf_check flask_xen_version(uint32_t op)
         /* These sub-ops ignore the permission checks and return data. */
         return 0;
     case XENVER_extraversion:
+    case XENVER_extraversion2:
         return avc_has_perm(dsid, SECINITSID_XEN, SECCLASS_VERSION,
                             VERSION__XEN_EXTRAVERSION, NULL);
     case XENVER_compile_info:
         return avc_has_perm(dsid, SECINITSID_XEN, SECCLASS_VERSION,
                             VERSION__XEN_COMPILE_INFO, NULL);
     case XENVER_capabilities:
+    case XENVER_capabilities2:
         return avc_has_perm(dsid, SECINITSID_XEN, SECCLASS_VERSION,
                             VERSION__XEN_CAPABILITIES, NULL);
     case XENVER_changeset:
+    case XENVER_changeset2:
         return avc_has_perm(dsid, SECINITSID_XEN, SECCLASS_VERSION,
                             VERSION__XEN_CHANGESET, NULL);
     case XENVER_pagesize:
@@ -1795,6 +1798,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_xen_version(uint32_t op)
         return avc_has_perm(dsid, SECINITSID_XEN, SECCLASS_VERSION,
                             VERSION__XEN_GUEST_HANDLE, NULL);
     case XENVER_commandline:
+    case XENVER_commandline2:
         return avc_has_perm(dsid, SECINITSID_XEN, SECCLASS_VERSION,
                             VERSION__XEN_COMMANDLINE, NULL);
     case XENVER_build_id:
-- 
2.11.0




 


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