[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] x86/xen: use clear_bss() for Xen PV guests
- To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 14:03:15 +0200
- Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>, Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>, Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, x86@xxxxxxxxxx, linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Delivery-date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 12:03:25 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On 23.06.22 11:51, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 23.06.2022 11:46, Juergen Gross wrote:
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -1183,15 +1183,19 @@ static void __init xen_domu_set_legacy_features(void)
extern void early_xen_iret_patch(void);
/* First C function to be called on Xen boot */
-asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(void)
+asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(struct start_info *si)
{
struct physdev_set_iopl set_iopl;
unsigned long initrd_start = 0;
int rc;
- if (!xen_start_info)
+ if (!si)
return;
+ clear_bss();
As per subsequent observation, this shouldn't really be needed: The
hypervisor (or tool stack for DomU-s) already does so. While I guess
we want to keep it to be on the safe side, maybe worth a comment?
Are you sure all possible boot loaders are clearing alloc-only sections?
I'd rather not count on e.g. grub doing this in all cases.
Juergen
Attachment:
OpenPGP_0xB0DE9DD628BF132F.asc
Description: OpenPGP public key
Attachment:
OpenPGP_signature
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
|