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Re: [PATCH V6 2/2] xen/arm: Harden the P2M code in p2m_remove_mapping()




On 23.06.22 21:08, Julien Grall wrote:
Hi Oleksandr,


Hello Julien



On 11/05/2022 19:47, Oleksandr Tyshchenko wrote:
From: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@xxxxxxxx>

Borrow the x86's check from p2m_remove_page() which was added
by the following commit: c65ea16dbcafbe4fe21693b18f8c2a3c5d14600e
"x86/p2m: don't assert that the passed in MFN matches for a remove"
and adjust it to the Arm code base.

Basically, this check is strictly needed for the xenheap pages only
since there are several non-protected read accesses to our simplified
xenheap based M2P approach on Arm (most calls to page_get_xenheap_gfn()
are not protected by the P2M lock).

To me, this read as you introduced a bug in patch #1 and now you are fixing it. So this patch should have been first.


Sounds like yes, I agree. But, in that case I propose to rewrite this text like the following:


Basically, this check will be strictly needed for the xenheap pages only *and* only after applying subsequent commit which will introduce xenheap based M2P approach on Arm. But, it will be a good opportunity to harden the P2M code for *every* RAM pages since it is possible to remove any GFN - MFN mapping
currently on Arm (even with the wrong helpers).


And ...




But, it will be a good opportunity to harden the P2M code for *every*
RAM pages since it is possible to remove any GFN - MFN mapping
currently on Arm (even with the wrong helpers).

This can result in
a few issues when mapping is overridden silently (in particular when
building dom0).

Hmmm... AFAIU, in such situation p2m_remove_mapping() wouldn't be called. Instead, we would call the mapping helper twice and the override would still happen.


   ... drop this one.





Suggested-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@xxxxxxxx>
---
You can find the corresponding discussion at:
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/82d8bfe0-cb46-d303-6a60-2324dd76a1f7@xxxxxxx/

Changes V5 -> V6:
  - new patch
---
  xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
index f87b48e..635e474 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
@@ -1311,11 +1311,32 @@ static inline int p2m_remove_mapping(struct domain *d,
                                       mfn_t mfn)
  {
      struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
+    unsigned long i;
      int rc;
        p2m_write_lock(p2m);
+    for ( i = 0; i < nr; )
One bit I really hate in the x86 code is the lack of in-code documentation. It makes really difficult to understand the logic.

I know this code was taken from x86, but I would like to avoid making same mistake (this code is definitely not trivial). So can we document the logic?


ok, I propose the following text right after acquiring the p2m lock:


 /*
  * Before removing the GFN - MFN mapping for any RAM pages make sure
  * that there is no difference between what is already mapped and what
  * is requested to be unmapped. If passed mapping doesn't match
  * the existing one bail out early.
  */


Could you please clarify, do you agree with both?



The code itself looks good to me.

Thanks!



+    {
+        unsigned int cur_order;
+        p2m_type_t t;
+        mfn_t mfn_return = p2m_get_entry(p2m, gfn_add(start_gfn, i), &t, NULL,
+                                         &cur_order, NULL);
+
+        if ( p2m_is_any_ram(t) &&
+             (!mfn_valid(mfn) || !mfn_eq(mfn_add(mfn, i), mfn_return)) )
+        {
+            rc = -EILSEQ;
+            goto out;
+        }
+
+        i += (1UL << cur_order) -
+             ((gfn_x(start_gfn) + i) & ((1UL << cur_order) - 1));
+    }
+
      rc = p2m_set_entry(p2m, start_gfn, nr, INVALID_MFN,
                         p2m_invalid, p2m_access_rwx);
+
+out:
      p2m_write_unlock(p2m);
        return rc;

Cheers,

--
Regards,

Oleksandr Tyshchenko




 


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