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Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/spec-ctrl: Fix NMI race condition with VT-x MSR_SPEC_CTRL handling



On 17/01/2022 09:21, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 14.01.2022 15:41, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 14/01/2022 14:14, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 13/01/2022 16:38, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>> The logic was based on a mistaken understanding of how NMI blocking on 
>>>> vmexit
>>>> works.  NMIs are only blocked for EXIT_REASON_NMI, and not for general 
>>>> exits.
>>>> Therefore, an NMI can in general hit early in the vmx_asm_vmexit_handler 
>>>> path,
>>>> and the guest's value will be clobbered before it is saved.
>>>>
>>>> Switch to using MSR load/save lists.  This causes the guest value to be 
>>>> saved
>>>> atomically with respect to NMIs/MCEs/etc.
>>>>
>>>> First, update vmx_cpuid_policy_changed() to configure the load/save lists 
>>>> at
>>>> the same time as configuring the intercepts.  This function is always used 
>>>> in
>>>> remote context, so extend the vmx_vmcs_{enter,exit}() block to cover the 
>>>> whole
>>>> function, rather than having multiple remote acquisitions of the same VMCS.
>>>>
>>>> vmx_add_guest_msr() can fail, but only in ways which are entirely fatal to 
>>>> the
>>>> guest, so handle failures using domain_crash().  vmx_del_msr() can fail 
>>>> with
>>>> -ESRCH but we don't matter, and this path will be taken during domain 
>>>> create
>>>> on a system lacking IBRSB.
>>>>
>>>> Second, update vmx_msr_{read,write}_intercept() to use the load/save lists
>>>> rather than vcpu_msrs, and update the comment to describe the new state
>>>> location.
>>>>
>>>> Finally, adjust the entry/exit asm.  Drop DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_HVM
>>>> entirely, and use a shorter code sequence to simply reload Xen's setting 
>>>> from
>>>> the top-of-stack block.
>>>>
>>>> Because the guest values are loaded/saved atomically, we do not need to use
>>>> the shadowing logic to cope with late NMIs/etc, so we can omit
>>>> DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST entirely and VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH with Xen's value 
>>>> in
>>>> context.  Furthermore, we can drop the SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV too, as 
>>>> there's
>>>> no need to switch back to Xen's context on an early failure.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> ---
>>>> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
>>>> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>
>>>> CC: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>> CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>>
>>>> Needs backporting as far as people can tolerate.
>>>>
>>>> If the entry/exit logic were in C, I'd ASSERT() that shadow tracking is 
>>>> off,
>>>> but this is awkard to arrange in asm.
>>> Actually, it's just occurred to me that an ASSERT is actually quite easy
>>> here.  I'm proposing this additional delta (totally untested).
>>>
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
>>> index 297ed8685126..f569c3259b32 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
>>> @@ -41,6 +41,13 @@ ENTRY(vmx_asm_vmexit_handler)
>>>              movzbl CPUINFO_xen_spec_ctrl(%rsp), %eax
>>>              xor    %edx, %edx
>>>              wrmsr
>>> +
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG
>>> +            testb $SCF_use_shadow, CPUINFO_spec_ctrl_flags(%rsp)
>>> +            jz 1f
>>> +            ASSERT_FAILED("MSR_SPEC_CTRL shadowing active")
>>> +1:
>>> +#endif
>>>          .endm
>>>          ALTERNATIVE "", restore_spec_ctrl, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM
>>>          /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
>> Irritatingly this doesn't work, because the metadata associated with the
>> ud2 instruction is tied to the compiled position in
>> .altinstr_replacement, not the runtime position after alternatives have run.
> Could we have the macro "return" ZF, leaving it to the invocation
> site of the macro to act on it? ALTERNATIVE's first argument could
> easily be "xor %reg, %reg" to set ZF without much other overhead.

That's very subtle, and a substantial layering violation.  I really
don't think the complexity is worth it.

~Andrew



 


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