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[PATCH 6/6] x86/hvm: Support PKS


  • To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2021 09:54:21 +0000
  • Authentication-results: esa1.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; dkim=none (message not signed) header.i=none
  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 16 Dec 2021 09:54:46 +0000
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  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

With all infrastructure in place, advertise the PKS CPUID bit to guests, and
let them set CR4.PKS.

Experiment with a tweak to the layout of hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits() so future
additions will be just a single added line.

The current context switching behaviour is tied to how VT-x works, so leave a
safety check in the short term.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c                        | 9 +++++++++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c                      | 4 +++-
 xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
index 151944f65702..03653d3766f4 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
@@ -512,6 +512,15 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void)
             __clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES, hvm_featureset);
     }
 
+    /*
+     * Xen doesn't use PKS, so the guest support for it has opted to not use
+     * the VMCS load/save controls for efficiency reasons.  This depends on
+     * the exact vmentry/exit behaviour, so don't expose PKS in other
+     * situations until someone has cross-checked the behaviour for safety.
+     */
+    if ( !cpu_has_vmx )
+        __clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PKS, hvm_featureset);
+
     guest_common_feature_adjustments(hvm_featureset);
 
     sanitise_featureset(hvm_featureset);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index e75245f36dce..2552e7f45499 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -1010,7 +1010,9 @@ unsigned long hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits(const struct 
domain *d)
             (p->feat.smep     ? X86_CR4_SMEP              : 0) |
             (p->feat.smap     ? X86_CR4_SMAP              : 0) |
             (p->feat.pku      ? X86_CR4_PKE               : 0) |
-            (cet              ? X86_CR4_CET               : 0));
+            (cet              ? X86_CR4_CET               : 0) |
+            (p->feat.pks      ? X86_CR4_PKS               : 0) |
+            0);
 }
 
 static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h 
b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
index 79a8f244d88a..92ec9eed3fd1 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(CLDEMOTE,      6*32+25) /*A  CLDEMOTE 
instruction */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(MOVDIRI,       6*32+27) /*a  MOVDIRI instruction */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(MOVDIR64B,     6*32+28) /*a  MOVDIR64B instruction */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(ENQCMD,        6*32+29) /*   ENQCMD{,S} instructions */
-XEN_CPUFEATURE(PKS,           6*32+31) /*   Protection Key for Supervisor */
+XEN_CPUFEATURE(PKS,           6*32+31) /*H  Protection Key for Supervisor */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007.edx, word 7 */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(HW_PSTATE,     7*32+ 7) /*   Hardware Pstates */
-- 
2.11.0




 


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