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[PATCH 3/6] VT-d: don't leak domid mapping on error path
- To: "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 10:48:43 +0100
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- Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 09:48:49 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
While domain_context_mapping() invokes domain_context_unmap() in a sub-
case of handling DEV_TYPE_PCI when encountering an error, thus avoiding
a leak, individual calls to domain_context_mapping_one() aren't
similarly covered. Such a leak might persist until domain destruction.
Leverage that these cases can be recognized by pdev being non-NULL.
Fixes: dec403cc668f ("VT-d: fix iommu_domid for PCI/PCIx devices assignment")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
The Fixes: tag isn't strictly correct, as error handling had more severe
shortcomings at the time. But I wouldn't want to blame a commit
improving error handling to have introduced the leak.
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1518,7 +1518,12 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(
rc = me_wifi_quirk(domain, bus, devfn, MAP_ME_PHANTOM_FUNC);
if ( rc )
- domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, bus, devfn);
+ {
+ ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, bus, devfn);
+
+ if ( !ret && pdev && pdev->devfn == devfn )
+ check_cleanup_domid_map(domain, pdev, iommu);
+ }
return rc;
}
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