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Re: [Stratos-dev] Xen Rust VirtIO demos work breakdown for Project Stratos



On Mon, 27 Sep 2021, Christopher Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 27, 2021 at 3:06 AM Alex Bennée via Stratos-dev 
> <stratos-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
>       Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> 
>       > [[PGP Signed Part:Undecided]]
>       > On Fri, Sep 24, 2021 at 05:02:46PM +0100, Alex Bennée wrote:
>       >> Hi,
>       >
>       > Hi,
>       >
>       >> 2.1 Stable ABI for foreignmemory mapping to non-dom0 ([STR-57])
>       >> ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
>       >>
>       >>   Currently the foreign memory mapping support only works for dom0 
> due
>       >>   to reference counting issues. If we are to support backends 
> running in
>       >>   their own domains this will need to get fixed.
>       >>
>       >>   Estimate: 8w
>       >>
>       >>
>       >> [STR-57] <https://linaro.atlassian.net/browse/STR-57>
>       >
>       > I'm pretty sure it was discussed before, but I can't find relevant
>       > (part of) thread right now: does your model assumes the backend 
> (running
>       > outside of dom0) will gain ability to map (or access in other way)
>       > _arbitrary_ memory page of a frontend domain? Or worse: any domain?
> 
>       The aim is for some DomU's to host backends for other DomU's instead of
>       all backends being in Dom0. Those backend DomU's would have to be
>       considered trusted because as you say the default memory model of VirtIO
>       is to have full access to the frontend domains memory map.
> 
> 
> I share Marek's concern. I believe that there are Xen-based systems that will 
> want to run guests using VirtIO devices without extending
> this level of trust to the backend domains.

>From a safety perspective, it would be challenging to deploy a system
with privileged backends. From a safety perspective, it would be a lot
easier if the backend were unprivileged.

This is one of those times where safety and security requirements are
actually aligned.

 


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