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Re: [PATCH v2 03/13] libxenguest: deal with log-dirty op stats overflow



On 05.07.21 17:13, Jan Beulich wrote:
In send_memory_live() the precise value the dirty_count struct field
gets initialized to doesn't matter much (apart from the triggering of
the log message in send_dirty_pages(), see below), but it is important
that it not be zero on the first iteration (or else send_dirty_pages()
won't get called at all). Saturate the initializer value at the maximum
value the field can hold.

While there also initialize struct precopy_stats' respective field to a
more sane value: We don't really know how many dirty pages there are at
that point.

In suspend_and_send_dirty() and verify_frames() the local variables
don't need initializing at all, as they're only an output from the
hypercall which gets invoked first thing.

In send_checkpoint_dirty_pfn_list() the local variable can be dropped
altogether: It's optional to xc_logdirty_control() and not used anywhere
else.

Note that in case the clipping actually takes effect, the "Bitmap
contained more entries than expected..." log message will trigger. This
being just an informational message, I don't think this is overly
concerning.

Is there any real reason why the width of the stats fields can't be
expanded to avoid clipping? This could avoid the need to set the
initial value to -1, which seems one of the more controversial changes.


Juergen

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