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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH] x86/cet: Fix shskt manipulation error with BUGFRAME_{warn,run_fn}
This was a clear oversight in the original CET work. The BUGFRAME_run_fn and
BUGFRAME_warn paths update regs->rip without an equivlenet adjustment to the
shadow stack, causes IRET to suffer #CP due to the mismatch.
One subtle, and therefore fragile, aspect of extable_shstk_fixup() was that it
required regs->rip to have its old value as a cross-check that the correct
word in the shadow stack was being adjusted.
Rework extable_shstk_fixup() into fixup_exception_return() which takes
ownership of the update to both the regular and shadow stacks, ensuring that
the regs->rip update is ordered suitably.
Use the new fixup_exception_return() for BUGFRAME_run_fn and BUGFRAME_warn to
ensure that the shadow stack is updated too.
Fixes: 209fb9919b50 ("x86/extable: Adjust extable handling to be shadow stack
compatible")
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>
CC: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Backport to 4.14
Only compile tested so far. My one CET-SS machine is in use for other
purposes right now.
I'm not a massive fan of the large ifdef area. The logic could be rearranged
to use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) by indenting most of the function, but I
can't see any way to drop the goto's, and this is certainly the least-invasive
diff.
---
xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index e60af16ddd8c..30eefbad4863 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -777,13 +777,15 @@ static void do_reserved_trap(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
trapnr, vec_name(trapnr), regs->error_code);
}
-static void extable_shstk_fixup(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, unsigned long
fixup)
+static void fixup_exception_return(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
+ unsigned long fixup)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK
unsigned long ssp, *ptr, *base;
asm ( "rdsspq %0" : "=r" (ssp) : "0" (1) );
if ( ssp == 1 )
- return;
+ goto shstk_done;
ptr = _p(ssp);
base = _p(get_shstk_bottom(ssp));
@@ -814,7 +816,7 @@ static void extable_shstk_fixup(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
unsigned long fixup)
asm ( "wrssq %[fix], %[stk]"
: [stk] "=m" (ptr[0])
: [fix] "r" (fixup) );
- return;
+ goto shstk_done;
}
}
@@ -824,6 +826,12 @@ static void extable_shstk_fixup(struct cpu_user_regs
*regs, unsigned long fixup)
* executing the interrupted context.
*/
BUG();
+
+ shstk_done:
+#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK */
+
+ /* Fixup the regular stack. */
+ regs->rip = fixup;
}
static bool extable_fixup(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, bool print)
@@ -842,10 +850,7 @@ static bool extable_fixup(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, bool
print)
vec_name(regs->entry_vector), regs->error_code,
_p(regs->rip), _p(regs->rip), _p(fixup));
- if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) )
- extable_shstk_fixup(regs, fixup);
-
- regs->rip = fixup;
+ fixup_exception_return(regs, fixup);
this_cpu(last_extable_addr) = regs->rip;
return true;
@@ -1138,7 +1143,7 @@ void do_invalid_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
void (*fn)(struct cpu_user_regs *) = bug_ptr(bug);
fn(regs);
- regs->rip = (unsigned long)eip;
+ fixup_exception_return(regs, (unsigned long)eip);
return;
}
@@ -1159,7 +1164,7 @@ void do_invalid_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
case BUGFRAME_warn:
printk("Xen WARN at %s%s:%d\n", prefix, filename, lineno);
show_execution_state(regs);
- regs->rip = (unsigned long)eip;
+ fixup_exception_return(regs, (unsigned long)eip);
return;
case BUGFRAME_bug:
--
2.11.0
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