Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] xen: harden blkfront against malicious backends

[Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>]

On 08.07.21 16:22, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 08, 2021 at 02:43:42PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
> > Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0
> > user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might
> > reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so
> > a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still
> > mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by
> > other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest).
> >
> > Unfortunately blkfront in the Linux kernel is fully trusting its
> > backend. This series is fixing blkfront in this regard.
> >
> > It was discussed to handle this as a security problem, but the topic
> > was discussed in public before, so it isn't a real secret.
> Wow. This looks like what Marek did .. in 2018!
>
> https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-04/msg02336.html
Yes, seems to have been a similar goal.

> Would it be worth crediting Marek?
I'm fine mentioning his patches, but I didn't know of his patches until
having sent out V1 of my series.

I'd be interested in learning why his patches haven't been taken back
then.


Juergen

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