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Re: [PATCH 3/5] x86/msr: Expose MSR_ARCH_CAPS in the raw and host policies

  • To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 15:10:03 +0100
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  • Cc: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@xxxxxxxxxx>, Edwin Torok <edvin.torok@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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On 14/06/2021 13:57, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 11.06.2021 18:36, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> @@ -60,6 +65,11 @@ static void __init calculate_host_policy(void)
>>      /* 0x000000ce  MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO */
>>      /* probe_cpuid_faulting() sanity checks presence of 
>>      mp->platform_info.cpuid_faulting = cpu_has_cpuid_faulting;
>> +
>> +    mp->arch_caps.raw &=
>>  }
> Isn't this a little too simple? For CPUID we consider the host policy
> to be what Xen is using. Taking ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL as an example,
> we're not using it unconditionally (depending on opt_md_clear_hvm and
> opt_l1d_flush), i.e. there's command line control over its use just
> like there is over the CPUID bits.

But we don't go clearing CPUID bits for features we choose not to use.

ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL, despite its name, is a statement of how hardware
(and/or out outer hypervisor) behaves.

It means "you don't need to flush the L1D on VMEntry to mitigate L1TF",
whether or not we employ fine tuning to change what Xen does.

>  Or take ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO, which
> we set unilaterally for AMD/Hygon.

That is local to spec_ctrl.c, and a mistake in hindsight.  It was
written at a point in time when it wasn't clear whether AMD were going
to implement MSR_ARCH_CAPS or not.

The logic in spec_ctrl.c will change substantially when we load
microcode and collect the raw/host policies at the start of boot.

> I don't mind it remaining this simple for the moment, but then at
> least the commit message should state that this is currently over-
> simplifying things. If you agree, then with suitable wording added:
> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

This is "mask all features not known by the Xen".  For CPUID bits, it's
done by the masking against known_features[] (autogenerated by
gen-cpuid.py), but we have no equivalent for MSRs yet.

We're definitely going to have to invent something (VT-x is going to be
a total nightmare without it), but I haven't got any clever ideas right now.

I'm happy to insert a comment saying that this is a substitute for not
having known_features[] for MSR bits yet.




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