[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 0/7] xen/events: bug fixes and some diagnostic aids
Hi Juergen, On 07/02/2021 12:58, Jürgen Groß wrote: On 06.02.21 19:46, Julien Grall wrote:Hi Juergen, On 06/02/2021 10:49, Juergen Gross wrote:The first three patches are fixes for XSA-332. The avoid WARN splats and a performance issue with interdomain events.Thanks for helping to figure out the problem. Unfortunately, I still see reliably the WARN splat with the latest Linux master (1e0d27fce010) + your first 3 patches.I am using Xen 4.11 (1c7d984645f9) and dom0 is forced to use the 2L events ABI.After some debugging, I think I have an idea what's went wrong. The problem happens when the event is initially bound from vCPU0 to a different vCPU.From the comment in xen_rebind_evtchn_to_cpu(), we are masking the event to prevent it being delivered on an unexpected vCPU. However, I believe the following can happen:vCPU0 | vCPU1 | | Call xen_rebind_evtchn_to_cpu() receive event X | | mask event X | bind to vCPU1 <vCPU descheduled> | unmask event X | | receive event X | | handle_edge_irq(X) handle_edge_irq(X) | -> handle_irq_event() | -> set IRQD_IN_PROGRESS -> set IRQS_PENDING | | -> evtchn_interrupt() | -> clear IRQD_IN_PROGRESS | -> IRQS_PENDING is set | -> handle_irq_event() | -> evtchn_interrupt() | -> WARN() |All the lateeoi handlers expect a ONESHOT semantic and evtchn_interrupt() is doesn't tolerate any deviation.I think the problem was introduced by 7f874a0447a9 ("xen/events: fix lateeoi irq acknowledgment") because the interrupt was disabled previously. Therefore we wouldn't do another iteration in handle_edge_irq().I think you picked the wrong commit for blaming, as this is just the last patch of the three patches you were testing. I actually found the right commit for blaming but I copied the information from the wrong shell :/. The bug was introduced by: c44b849cee8c ("xen/events: switch user event channels to lateeoi model") Aside the handlers, I think it may impact the defer EOI mitigation because in theory if a 3rd vCPU is joining the party (let say vCPU A migrate the event from vCPU B to vCPU C). So info->{eoi_cpu, irq_epoch, eoi_time} could possibly get mangled?For a fix, we may want to consider to hold evtchn_rwlock with the write permission. Although, I am not 100% sure this is going to prevent everything.It will make things worse, as it would violate the locking hierarchy (xen_rebind_evtchn_to_cpu() is called with the IRQ-desc lock held). Ah, right. On a first glance I think we'll need a 3rd masking state ("temporarily masked") in the second patch in order to avoid a race with lateeoi. In order to avoid the race you outlined above we need an "event is being handled" indicator checked via test_and_set() semantics in handle_irq_for_port() and reset only when calling clear_evtchn(). It feels like we are trying to workaround the IRQ flow we are using (i.e. handle_edge_irq()). This reminds me the thread we had before discovering XSA-332 (see [1]). Back then, it was suggested to switch back to handle_fasteoi_irq(). Cheers,[1] https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/alpine.DEB.2.21.2004271552430.29217@sstabellini-ThinkPad-T480s/ -- Julien Grall
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