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Re: [PATCH 1/2] xen/privcmd: Corrected error handling path and mark pages dirty



On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 5:01 AM Boris Ostrovsky
<boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 6/24/20 11:02 PM, Souptick Joarder wrote:
> > Previously, if lock_pages() end up partially mapping pages, it used
> > to return -ERRNO due to which unlock_pages() have to go through
> > each pages[i] till *nr_pages* to validate them. This can be avoided
> > by passing correct number of partially mapped pages & -ERRNO separately,
> > while returning from lock_pages() due to error.
> >
> > With this fix unlock_pages() doesn't need to validate pages[i] till
> > *nr_pages* for error scenario and few condition checks can be ignored.
> >
> > As discussed, pages need to be marked as dirty before unpinned it in
> > unlock_pages() which was oversight.
>
>
> There are two unrelated changes here (improving error path and marking
> pages dirty), they should be handled by separate patches.

Sure, will do it in v2.

>
>
> (I assume marking pages dirty is something you want to go to stable tree
> since otherwise there is no reason for making this change)
>
>
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Paul Durrant <xadimgnik@xxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > Hi,
> >
> > I'm compile tested this,
>
>
> I don't think so.

I compile test it against ARM and it was fine.
Against which ARCH is it failing ?

>
>
> >  but unable to run-time test, so any testing
> > help is much appriciated.
> >
> >  drivers/xen/privcmd.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
> >  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
> > index a250d11..0da417c 100644
> > --- a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
> > +++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
> > @@ -580,43 +580,44 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(
> >
> >  static int lock_pages(
> >       struct privcmd_dm_op_buf kbufs[], unsigned int num,
> > -     struct page *pages[], unsigned int nr_pages)
> > +     struct page *pages[], unsigned int nr_pages, int *pinned)
> >  {
> >       unsigned int i;
> > +     int errno = 0, page_count = 0;
>
>
> No need for error, really --- you can return the value immediately.

yes, this is unnecessary.

>
>
> >
> >       for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
> >               unsigned int requested;
> > -             int pinned;
> >
> > +             *pinned += page_count;
>
>
> I'd move this lower, after a successful call to get_user_pages_fast()
> (and then you won't need to initialize it)

Ok.

>
>
> >               requested = DIV_ROUND_UP(
> >                       offset_in_page(kbufs[i].uptr) + kbufs[i].size,
> >                       PAGE_SIZE);
> >               if (requested > nr_pages)
> >                       return -ENOSPC;
> >
> > -             pinned = get_user_pages_fast(
> > +             page_count = get_user_pages_fast(
> >                       (unsigned long) kbufs[i].uptr,
> >                       requested, FOLL_WRITE, pages);
> > -             if (pinned < 0)
> > -                     return pinned;
> > +             if (page_count < 0) {
> > +                     errno = page_count;
> > +                     return errno;
> > +             }
> >
> > -             nr_pages -= pinned;
> > -             pages += pinned;
> > +             nr_pages -= page_count;
> > +             pages += page_count;
> >       }
> >
> > -     return 0;
> > +     return errno;
> >  }
> >
> >  static void unlock_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned int nr_pages)
> >  {
> >       unsigned int i;
> >
> > -     if (!pages)
> > -             return;
> > -
> >       for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
> > -             if (pages[i])
> > -                     put_page(pages[i]);
> > +             if (!PageDirty(page))
> > +                     set_page_dirty_lock(page);
> > +             put_page(pages[i]);
> >       }
>
>
> This won't compile.
>
>
> -boris
>
>
>



 


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