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Re: [PATCH for-4.14] x86/tlb: fix assisted flush usage



On 23.06.2020 11:25, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 05:30:11PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 22.06.2020 16:56, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 03:51:24PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 22.06.2020 15:24, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 01:07:10PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> On 22.06.2020 11:31, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
>>>>>>> On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 04:06:55PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 18.06.2020 18:04, Roger Pau Monne wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Commit e9aca9470ed86 introduced a regression when avoiding sending
>>>>>>>>> IPIs for certain flush operations. Xen page fault handler
>>>>>>>>> (spurious_page_fault) relies on blocking interrupts in order to
>>>>>>>>> prevent handling TLB flush IPIs and thus preventing other CPUs from
>>>>>>>>> removing page tables pages. Switching to assisted flushing avoided 
>>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>> IPIs, and thus can result in pages belonging to the page tables being
>>>>>>>>> removed (and possibly re-used) while __page_fault_type is being
>>>>>>>>> executed.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Force some of the TLB flushes to use IPIs, thus avoiding the assisted
>>>>>>>>> TLB flush. Those selected flushes are the page type change (when
>>>>>>>>> switching from a page table type to a different one, ie: a page that
>>>>>>>>> has been removed as a page table) and page allocation. This sadly has
>>>>>>>>> a negative performance impact on the pvshim, as less assisted flushes
>>>>>>>>> can be used.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Introduce a new flag (FLUSH_FORCE_IPI) and helper to force a TLB flush
>>>>>>>>> using an IPI (flush_tlb_mask_sync). Note that the flag is only
>>>>>>>>> meaningfully defined when the hypervisor supports PV mode, as
>>>>>>>>> otherwise translated domains are in charge of their page tables and
>>>>>>>>> won't share page tables with Xen, thus not influencing the result of
>>>>>>>>> page walks performed by the spurious fault handler.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Is this true for shadow mode? If a page shadowing a guest one was
>>>>>>>> given back quickly enough to the allocator and then re-used, I think
>>>>>>>> the same situation could in principle arise.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hm, I think it's not applicable to HVM shadow mode at least, because
>>>>>>> CR3 is switched as part of vmentry/vmexit, and the page tables are not
>>>>>>> shared between Xen and the guest, so there's no way for a HVM shadow
>>>>>>> guest to modify the page-tables while Xen is walking them in
>>>>>>> spurious_page_fault (note spurious_page_fault is only called when the
>>>>>>> fault happens in non-guest context).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm afraid I disagree, because of shadow's use of "linear page tables".
>>>>>
>>>>> You will have to bear with me, but I don't follow.
>>>>>
>>>>> Could you provide some pointers at how/where the shadow (I assume
>>>>> guest controlled) "linear page tables" are used while in Xen
>>>>> context?
>>>>
>>>> See config.h:
>>>>
>>>> /* Slot 258: linear page table (guest table). */
>>>> #define LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START    (PML4_ADDR(258))
>>>> #define LINEAR_PT_VIRT_END      (LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START + PML4_ENTRY_BYTES)
>>>> /* Slot 259: linear page table (shadow table). */
>>>> #define SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START (PML4_ADDR(259))
>>>> #define SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_END   (SH_LINEAR_PT_VIRT_START + 
>>>> PML4_ENTRY_BYTES)
>>>>
>>>> These linear page tables exist in the Xen page tables at basically
>>>> all times as long as a shadow guest's vCPU is in context. They're
>>>> there to limit the overhead of accessing guest page tables and
>>>> their shadows from inside Xen.
>>>
>>> Oh, I have to admit I know very little about all this, and I'm not
>>> able to find a description of how this is to be used.
>>>
>>> I think the shadow linear page tables should be per-pCPU, and hence
>>> they cannot be modified by the guest while a spurious page fault is
>>> being processed? (since the vCPU running on the pCPU is in Xen
>>> context).
>>
>> A guest would have for some linear address e.g.
>>
>> vCR3 -> G4 -> G3 -> G2 -> G1
>>
>> visible to some random set of its CPUs (i.e. the same CR3 can be in
>> use by multiple vCPU-s). This will then have shadows like this:
>>
>> pCR3 -> S4 -> S3 -> S2 -> S1
>>
>> The G4 page gets hooked up into LINEAR_PT (i.e. becomes an L3 page)
>> for all vCPU-s that have this very CR3 active. Same goes for S4 and
>> SH_LINEAR_PT respectively. Afaik shadows of guest page tables also
>> don't get created on a per-pCPU basis - a page table either has a
>> shadow, or it doesn't.
>>
>> Hence afaict page tables mapped through these facilities (and
>> reachable while in Xen) can very well be modified "behind our backs".
> 
> Oh, I see. I'm still slightly puzzled because __hvm_copy seems to
> always map the guest page, and sh_gva_to_gfn also seems to just walk
> the guest page tables using the software implemented page table
> walker, and returns a gfn (not a mfn). I was expecting __hvm_copy to
> somehow make use of those shadow page tables when performing accesses
> to guest memory?

No, that's using the guest page table walker plus the p2m table
instead.

> Is shadow code using some of this internally then?

Yes. Just grep the shadow code for linear_l[1234]_table to find
the uses.

Jan



 


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