[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] x86: refine guest_mode()
On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 03:55:39PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 26.05.2020 12:56, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 02:00:22PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> On 22.05.2020 12:48, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > >>> On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 11:52:42AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>>> On 20.05.2020 17:13, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > >>>>> OK, so I think I'm starting to understand this all. Sorry it's taken > >>>>> me so long. So it's my understanding that diff != 0 can only happen in > >>>>> Xen context, or when in an IST that has a different stack (ie: MCE, NMI > >>>>> or DF according to current.h) and running in PV mode? > >>>>> > >>>>> Wouldn't in then be fine to use (r)->cs & 3 to check we are in guest > >>>>> mode if diff != 0? I see a lot of other places where cs & 3 is already > >>>>> used to that effect AFAICT (like entry.S). > >>>> > >>>> Technically this would be correct afaics, but the idea with all this > >>>> is (or should I say "looks to be"?) to have the checks be as tight as > >>>> possible, to make sure we don't mistakenly consider something "guest > >>>> mode" which really isn't. IOW your suggestion would be fine with me > >>>> if we could exclude bugs anywhere in the code. But since this isn't > >>>> realistic, I consider your suggestion to be relaxing things by too > >>>> much. > >>> > >>> OK, so I take that (long time) we might also want to change the cs & 3 > >>> checks from entry.S to check against __HYPERVISOR_CS explicitly? > >> > >> I didn't think so, no (not the least because of there not being any > >> guarantee afaik that EFI runtime calls couldn't play with segment > >> registers; they shouldn't, yes, but there's a lot of other "should" > >> many don't obey to). Those are guaranteed PV-only code paths. The > >> main issue here is that ->cs cannot be relied upon when a frame > >> points at HVM state. > > > > Well, if it points at HVM state it could equally have __HYPERVISOR_CS > > set by the guest. > > No, that's not the point. ->cs will never be __HYPERVISOR_CS in that > case, as we never store the guest's CS selector there. Instead > hvm_invalidate_regs_fields() clobbers the field in debug builds (with > a value resulting in RPL 3), but zero (i.e. a value implying RPL 0) > remains in place in release builds. > > Instead of doing this clobbering in debug mode only, we could - as I > think I did suggest before - clobber always, but just once during vCPU > init rather than on every VM exit. In debug mode we could then instead > check that the dummy values didn't themselves get clobbered. It would make sense to clobber it always with a value that has RPL > 0, so that it's consistent with PV state. > > Will things work anyway if you get here from an exception generated by > > EFI code that has changed the code segment? You are going to hit the > > assert at least, since diff will be != 0 and cs != __HYPERVISOR_CS? > > What would guarantee the latter? Additionally they could in principle > also have switched stacks then, i.e. diff may then also be larger than > PRIMARY_STACK_SIZE, in which case - with the patch in place - the > assertion is bypassed altogether. > > > I would prefer to keep things coherent by either using cs & 3 or > > cs == __HYPERVISOR_CS everywhere if possible, as I'm still unsure of > > the benefit of using __HYPERVISOR_CS. > > See above. Well, I think it's an improvement overall, as it allows to properly handle the case where a PV guest could manage to trigger an exception that uses a stack different than the primary one. Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Roger.
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