[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v4] x86: clear RDRAND CPUID bit on AMD family 15h/16h
On Mon, Mar 09, 2020 at 10:08:50AM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote: > Inspired by Linux commit c49a0a80137c7ca7d6ced4c812c9e07a949f6f24: > > There have been reports of RDRAND issues after resuming from suspend on > some AMD family 15h and family 16h systems. This issue stems from a BIOS > not performing the proper steps during resume to ensure RDRAND continues > to function properly. > > Update the CPU initialization to clear the RDRAND CPUID bit for any family > 15h and 16h processor that supports RDRAND. If it is known that the family > 15h or family 16h system does not have an RDRAND resume issue or that the > system will not be placed in suspend, the "cpuid=rdrand" kernel parameter > can be used to stop the clearing of the RDRAND CPUID bit. > > Note, that clearing the RDRAND CPUID bit does not prevent a processor > that normally supports the RDRAND instruction from executing it. So any > code that determined the support based on family and model won't #UD. > > Warn if no explicit choice was given on affected hardware. > > Check RDRAND functions at boot as well as after S3 resume (the retry > limit chosen is entirely arbitrary). > > Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > Still slightly RFC, and still in particular because of the change to > parse_xen_cpuid(): Alternative approach suggestions are welcome. But now > also because with many CPUs there may now be a lot of warnings in case > of issues. > --- > v4: Check always, including during boot. Slightly better sanity check, > inspired by Linux commit 7879fc4bdc7. > v3: Add call to warning_add(). If force-enabled, check RDRAND still > functioning after S3 resume. > v2: Re-base. > > --- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc > +++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc > @@ -488,6 +488,10 @@ The Speculation Control hardware feature > be ignored, e.g. `no-ibrsb`, at which point Xen won't use them itself, and > won't offer them to guests. > > +`rdrand` can be used to override the default disabling of the feature on > certain > +AMD systems. Its negative form can of course also be used to suppress use > and > +exposure of the feature. > + > ### cpuid_mask_cpu > > `= fam_0f_rev_[cdefg] | fam_10_rev_[bc] | fam_11_rev_b` > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c > @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ > #include <xen/param.h> > #include <xen/smp.h> > #include <xen/pci.h> > +#include <xen/warning.h> > #include <asm/io.h> > #include <asm/msr.h> > #include <asm/processor.h> > @@ -646,6 +647,25 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 > if (acpi_smi_cmd && (acpi_enable_value | acpi_disable_value)) > amd_acpi_c1e_quirk = true; > break; > + > + case 0x15: case 0x16: > + /* > + * There are too many Fam15/Fam16 systems where upon resume > + * from S3 firmware fails to re-setup properly functioning > + * RDRAND. Clear the feature unless force-enabled on the > + * command line. > + */ > + if (c == &boot_cpu_data && > + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) && > + !is_forced_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) { Given this is the only user of is_forced_cpu_cap... > + static const char __initconst text[] = > + "RDRAND may cease to work on this hardware upon > resume from S3.\n" > + "Please choose an explicit cpuid={no-}rdrand > setting.\n"; > + > + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND); > + warning_add(text); > + } > + break; > } > > display_cacheinfo(c); > --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > #include <asm/io.h> > #include <asm/mpspec.h> > #include <asm/apic.h> > +#include <asm/random.h> > #include <asm/setup.h> > #include <mach_apic.h> > #include <public/sysctl.h> /* for XEN_INVALID_{SOCKET,CORE}_ID */ > @@ -98,6 +99,11 @@ void __init setup_force_cpu_cap(unsigned > __set_bit(cap, boot_cpu_data.x86_capability); > } > > +bool is_forced_cpu_cap(unsigned int cap) ... I think this could be made __init? Thanks, Roger.
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